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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Alaska Law Review’s Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of selected state and 
federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law. They are neither comprehensive in breadth, as 
several cases are omitted, nor in depth, as many issues within individual cases are omitted. 
Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an authoritative guide; rather, they are intended 
to alert the Alaska legal community to judicial decisions from the previous year. The summaries 
are grouped by subject matter. 
 
 
  
2 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
Central Recycling Services, INC. v. Municipality of Anchorage 
In Central Recycling Services, INC. v. Municipality of Anchorage,1 the supreme court held that 
the Municipality of Anchorage properly interpreted the relevant ordinance and was correct in not 
providing rebates for the recycling of concrete, asphalt, tires, and lumber.2 Central Recycling 
Services, Inc. provides recycling services for construction and demolition waste – materials 
mainly including cardboard, glass, steel, aluminum, copper, asphalt, concrete, tires, and lumber.3 
For entities who are primarily engaged in the disposal of recyclable materials, the Municipality 
of Anchorage provides reduced fees at landfills for the solid waste generated from some 
recyclable materials.4 The municipal ordinance provides that a rebate may be given for 
companies that recycle paper, plastic, glass and steel, aluminum, copper and brass.5 Central 
Recycling submitted rebates to the Municipality for waste fees associated with the recycling of 
both materials listed in the ordinance and materials not listed in the ordinance. 6 However, the 
Municipality only provided rebates for the listed materials.7 Central Recycling brought suit, 
claiming the Municipality incorrectly interpreted the ordinance and unlisted materials should be 
subject to the rebate.8 The supreme court, agreeing with the superior court, found that the 
Municipality properly interpreted the ordinance by not including the unlisted materials. 9 The 
court first considered the text itself, conceding that the ordinance was too ambiguous to interpret 
based on its language alone.10 The court then considered the relevant legislative history, finding 
that the original version of the ordinance contained no list and the list was later added to limit 
eligibility.11 Agreeing with the Municipality, the supreme court found that the Municipality of 
Anchorage properly interpreted the relevant ordinance and correctly did not provide rebates for 
the unlisted materials.12  
 
Horner-Neufeld v. University of Alaska Fairbanks 
In Horner-Neufeld v. University of Alaska Fairbanks,13 the supreme court held that a state 
university’s dismissal of a Ph.D. student did not violate either procedural or substantive due 
process.14 The University of Alaska Fairbanks dismissed Horner-Neufeld from its School of 
Fisheries and Ocean Science Ph.D. program in January 2009.15 At the time of her dismissal, 
Horner-Neufeld, who had joined the program in 2003, had failed to file required advisory 
                                                     
1 389 P.3d 54 (Alaska 2017). 
2 Id. at 61. 
3 Id. at 56. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 61. 
10 Id. at 58. 
11 Id. at 60. 
12 Id. at 61.  
13 389 P.3d 6 (Alaska 2017). 
14 Id. at 12. The court also upheld as supported by substantial evidence the university’s findings that the 
student was not subject to discrimination. Id. at 12–14. 
15 Id. at 10. 
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committee reports for three consecutive years, had failed to submit a complete thesis project 
proposal (generally required after eighteen months), had failed to take the required 
comprehensive exam (generally taken after two years), and had gone nine months without an 
advisor.16 The University made Horner-Neufeld aware of the various program requirements and 
deadlines, including the need for an advisor, in multiple direct communications to her and in its 
student handbooks and guidelines.17 Horner-Neufeld sought judicial review of the dismissal, 
arguing that it violated procedural and substantive due process.18 The supreme court explained 
that for an academic dismissal to comport with procedural due process, the student must have 
had notice and the university must have made a careful decision.19 The court then determined 
that the University had given Horner-Neufeld opportunity to correct her poor performance on 
multiple occasions, and that the decision to dismiss her after six years was careful and 
deliberate.20 The supreme court then explained that an academic dismissal violates substantive 
due process if it departs from academic norms in such a way that the decision maker was not 
exercising professional judgment, and that this was not the case in Horner-Neufeld’s situation.21 
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that Horner-Neufeld’s dismissal did 
not violate due process.22 
 
Radebaugh v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Radebaugh v. State,23 the supreme court held that an administrative agency decision is subject 
to the highly deferential substantial evidence test unless it reverses an administrative law judge’s 
underlying factual determination that was based on credibility determination, to which the 
agency’s decision is then subject to a heightened scrutiny standard.24 Radebaugh was a 70-year-
old woman with various disabilities who was disqualified from a Department of Health and 
Social Services (DHSS) program that provides disabled Alaskans with in-home care services.25 
Radebaugh appealed DHSS’s decision to an administrative law judge (ALJ), who reversed 
DHSS initial termination decision.26  However, DHSS rejected the ALJ’s determination and re-
affirmed its initial decision to terminate Radebaugh’s services.27 Radebaugh appealed DHSS’s 
final agency determination first to the superior court and then to the supreme court.28 She argued 
that DHSS’s final agency decision violated her due process rights because when the agency 
reverses an ALJ’s factual determination, that reversal is subject to heightened scrutiny, which 
DHSS failed to meet.29 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision by applying the 
substantial evidence test, which requires that final agency decisions have “such relevant evidence 
                                                     
16 Id. at 9–10. 
17 See id. at 9–10, 15–18. 
18 Id. at 17–18. 
19 Id. at 16. 
20 Id. at 18. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 18. 
23 397 P.3d 285 (Alaska 2017). 
24 Id. at 294. 
25 Id. at 287–88. 
26 Id. at 290. 
27 Id. at 291. 
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 293. 
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as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”30 The court stated that 
the test is highly deferential to the agency’s decision and allows for reversal only if, when 
reviewing the entire record, the court finds that the evidence detracting from the agency’s 
decision is dramatically disproportionate to the evidence.31 Although the court conceded that 
heightened scrutiny may apply when an agency is overruling an ALJ’s credibility 
determinations, that was not the case here where DHSS’s decision was based on substantial 
credible evidence.32 Therefore, the supreme court held that an administrative agency decision is 
subject to the highly deferential substantial evidence test unless it reverses an administrative law 
judge’s underlying factual determination which was based on the fact-finder’s credibility 
determination, to which the agency’s decision is then subject to a heightened scrutiny standard.33 
 
Wright v. Anding 
In Wright v. Anding,34 the supreme court held that a prisoner does not make a valid claim of 
medical mistreatment when conflicting physician opinions lead the Department of Correction’s 
(DOC) to deny medically necessary treatment.35 Wright, an inmate, began complaining of loss of 
hearing and ear infections in 2009 and was treated.36 Following an appointment in October of 
2010, where a doctor initially recommended hearing aids,37 Wright’s repeated requests for 
hearing aids were denied.38 Wright was subsequently seen by multiple specialists who 
determined he did not require hearing aids, though one eventually recommended he be given a 
Pocket Talker which Wright received.39 On appeal, Wright argued that the DOC was deliberately 
indifferent to his serious medical need for hearing aids and therefore, the court erred in granting 
summary judgment.40 The supreme court, assuming that Wright had a serious medical issue, 
explained that medical mistreatment claims require a prisoner allege deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs.41 It elaborated that deliberate indifference means that the corrections 
officials know of and disregard an excessive risk to an inmate’s health and safety which could 
result in further significant injury or unnecessary pain if untreated.42 It reasoned that the DOC’s 
decision to follow the latter recommendation of specialists over an earlier recommendation that 
Wright receive hearing aids did not constitute deliberate indifference.43 Affirming the lower 
court’s decision, the supreme court held a prisoner does not make a valid claim of medical 
mistreatment when conflicting physician opinions lead the Department of Correction’s (DOC) to 
deny medically necessary treatment.44 
 
                                                     
30 Id. at 293. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 294–95. 
33 Id. at 294. 
34 390 P.3d 1162 (Alaska 2017). 
35 Id. at 1174. 
36 Id. at 1165.  
37 Id. at 1172–73. 
38 Id. at 1165–67. 
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 1171. 
41 Id. at 1173. 
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 1174. 
44 Id. 
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Yankee v. City & Borough of Juneau 
In Yankee v. City & Borough of Juneau,45 the supreme court held that an administrative agency’s 
discretionary enforcement decision is not subject to judicial review.46  Yankee owned a plat of 
land adjacent to the Gilbertos’, but the two properties were in different subdivisions in Juneau.47 
Accordingly, each property was subject to different covenants.48 After receiving approval from 
Community Development Department (CDD) of the City and Borough of Juneau (CBJ), the 
Gilbertos built a fence on their plat.49 Yankee complained to the CDD, asserting that the fence 
violated two restrictive covenants.50 The Director of the CDD sent a letter to Yankee informing 
Yankee of his decision that the Gilbertos’ fence did not violate the covenants.51 After appealing to 
the CBJ Planning Commission and CBJ Assembly.52  While the Planning Commission ruled 
against Yankee on the merits, the Assembly determined that Yankee lacked standing because he 
did not own property in the Gilbertos subdivision.53 Yankee appealed the Director’s decision to 
the superior court, which affirmed the Assembly’s decision.54 On appeal to the supreme court, 
Yankee argued that he had standing.55 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision on 
different grounds, declining to review executive branch decisions to not prosecute an individual or 
enforce a law.56 The court reasoned that when an act is committed to executive discretion and the 
discretion is exercised within constitutional bounds, a court interfering with that discretion would 
violate separation of powers.57 The court found that courts are less inclined to intrude when the 
matter falls within a subject matter that is traditionally recognized as within an agency’s 
discretionary power than when the agency has acted in a novel or questionable fashion.58 However, 
the court noted that not all enforcement decisions are unreviewable; the legislature could statutorily 
empower courts to review such decisions.59 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme 
court held that an administrative agency’s discretionary enforcement decision is not subject to 
judicial review.60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
45 407 P.3d 460 (Alaska 2017). 
46 Id. at 463. 
47 Id. at 461. 
48 Id.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 461–62. 
51 Id. at 462. 
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 463. 
56 Id. at 464. 
57 Id. at 465. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 466. 
60 Id. at 467. 
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BUSINESS LAW 
 
Comsult LLC v. Girdwood Mining Co. 
In Comsult LLC v. Girdwood Mining Co.,61 the supreme court held that stock and royalty 
interests are property, and that suit to enforce rights to them is not barred by Alaska securities 
law.62 Girdwood Mining Company (Girdwood) and Comsult LLC (Comsult) entered into two 
agreements, the business relationship soured, and the parties executed a Memorandum of 
Understanding terminating both agreements.63 Under the Memorandum, Girdwood was to 
compensate Comsult by issuing a promissory note and awarding Comsult 60,000 shares of stock 
and a royalty.64 Comsult sued Girdwood, seeking payment on the unpaid promissory note, and 
Girdwood confessed judgment.65 Girdwood then sued Comsult seeking to cancel Comsult’s 
stock and royalty interests, arguing that the relevant portions of the agreement were illegal under 
Alaska securities law, and therefore void.66 The superior court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Comsult.67 On appeal, Girdwood argued that Comsult was barred by statute from suing 
to enforce stock royalty interests that stemmed from the illegal contract, but the supreme court 
disagreed.68 The court reasoned that both corporate stock and mineral royalty interests are 
property.69 Therefore, although a contract suit would have been barred by statute, the court 
determined that the instant suit was to enforce property rights and therefore not barred.70 
Reversing and remanding the lower court, the supreme court held that stock and royalty interests 
are property, and therefore are enforceable even if they obtained in a contract illegal under 
securities law.71 
 
Daggett v. Feeney 
In Daggett v. Feeney,72 the court held that (1) companies that provide wind turbine installation 
must be registered as specialty steel erection contractors, and (2) in calculating the setoff amount 
under a rescinded contract, the liable company’s offset amount can only equal that greater than 
any profit received.73 Feeney entered into a contract with Alaskan Wind Industries (AWI), where 
AWI was to provide and install a wind turbine, inverter and tower on Feeney’s property.74 AWI 
falsely stated it was a licensed steel erector in Alaska.75 The superior court allowed Feeney to 
rescind the contract due to the misrepresentation and allowed him to regain his down payment 
less an offset; in determining this offset amount, the superior court did not subtract AWI’s profits 
                                                     
61 397 P.3d 318 (Alaska 2017). 
62 Id. at 321. 
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 Id. 
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 320–21.  
71 Id. at 320. 
72 397 P.3d 297 (Alaska 2017). 
73 Id. at 309.  
74 Id. at 300.  
75 Id. at 300–01. 
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gained from reselling parts.76 AWI then failed to repay the damages and the superior court 
granted Feeney with the right to collect the amount from its undisclosed principal, Daggett 
LLC.77 Daggett argued AWI was exempt from registering because wind turbine installation fell 
under section 08.18.161(4) of the Alaska Statutes’ exemption for contractors installing “finished 
products.”78 The supreme court rejected this argument, holding that wind turbine installation was 
not covered under the exemption because it was not a finished project that would become a fixed 
and permanent structure or part of a structure.79 The supreme court also held that a company’s 
profits must factor into the determination of offset amounts.80 Therefore, the supreme court 
affirmed the superior court’s decision in part, holding that wind turbine installation companies 
must be registered, and reversed the superior court’s determination of offset amounts, holding it 
must equal the costs less the profits.81  
 
Ivy v. Calais Company, et al. 
In Ivy v. Calais Company, et al.,82 the supreme court held that a contract that requires the 
appraisal of a corporation’s fair value requires a valuation not of the fair market value of the 
corporation’s assets, but rather the liquidation value of the company.83 In 2007, Ivy filed for the 
involuntary dissolution of Calais company.84 Two years later, Ivy and Calais reached a 
settlement in which Ivy agreed to withdraw her claims while Calais agreed to purchase Ivy’s 
shares of Calais company stock at their fair market value, as determined by a panel of three 
appraisers.85 Ivy argued that the appraisal panel’s was not properly instructed by the superior 
court given the supreme court’s order for the superior court to provide “explicit instructions to 
calculate [the] ‘fair value’” of the company in accordance with Alaska Statute 10.06.630(a) and 
the terms of the agreement.86 The supreme court affirmed the superior court decision, explaining 
that the lower court’s instructions to calculate the fair value of the company by taking into 
account capital gains taxes and the possibility of the sale of the business as a going concern value 
was in accordance with its prior ruling.87 The supreme court explained that the appraisal panel 
“taking into account the possibility of sale of the entire business as a going concern in a 
liquidation” is not synonymous with a requirement that the appraisal panel actually do so.88 The 
supreme court held the a contract that requires the appraisal of a corporation’s fair value requires 
a proper valuation of the liquidation value of the company rather than solely the fair market 
value of its assets.89 
 
 
                                                     
76 Id. at 302–04. 
77 Id. at 303. 
78 Id. at 304–05. 
79 Id. at 306. 
80 Id. at 309. 
81 Id. at 311–12. 
82 397 P.3d 267 (Alaska 2017).  
83 Id. at 272. 
84 Id. at 271. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 272. 
87 Id. at 273 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 272. 
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CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
Alaska Building, Inc. v. Legislative Affairs Agency 
In Alaska Building, Inc. v. Legislative Affairs Agency,90 the supreme court held that Alaska Civil 
Rule 11 sanctions are for frivolous claims or claims that are made in bad faith, not claims that 
have little likelihood of success.91 Alaska Legislative Affairs Agency and 716 West Fourth 
Avenue LLC entered into a lease agreement to renovate and expand the Legislative Information 
Office building which included demolishing an adjoining building and the Agency agreeing to 
pay a maximum of $7.5 million for certain “tenant improvements.”92 The owner of the property 
next door, Alaska Building, Inc., filed a lawsuit challenging the lease agreement and renovation 
for the agreement’s alleged violation of 36.30.0830(a) of the Alaska Statute.93 Alaska Building, 
Inc. argued that if it succeeded in invalidating or reforming the lease, then it should receive 
judgment of 10 percent of the resulting savings to the Alaska Legislative Affairs Agency.94 The 
lower court imposed a sanction under Alaska Civil Rule 11 for this percentage-of-savings claim 
on the grounds that it was “frivolous,” but the court did not explain why.95 The supreme court 
held that for Rule 11(b)(2) sanctions, courts must determine whether a party’s “claims, defenses, 
and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for . . . 
establishing new law,” and “make a clear record” for their rationale for imposing a sanction.96 In 
particular, the supreme court emphasized that a Rule 11 sanction is not determined based off of 
the merits of a claim, but rather “whether the attorney has abused the judicial process,”97 as Rule 
11 was “designed to deter parties from abusing judicial resources, not from filing [claims].”98 
Here, despite the percentage-of-savings claim being unlikely to prevail and was a claim that was 
a form of “creative advocacy,”99 there was no evidence that it was frivolous or brought in bad 
faith.100 Overall, Alaska Civil Rule 11 sanctions are reserved for frivolous claims or claims made 
in bad faith.101 
 
Alaska Miners Ass’n v. State, Division of Elections 
In Alaska Miners Ass’n v. State, Division of Elections,102 the supreme court held that under 
section 09.60.010(c) of the Alaska Statutes, constitutional claimants (if they lose the litigation) 
are not required to pay the attorneys’ fees for the prevailing party; a party is not a constitutional 
claimant if it has received a direct economic benefit, therefore having a “sufficient economic 
incentive” for bringing the action.103 Alaska Miners Association brought an action questioning 
the constitutionality of Lieutenant Governor Mead Treadwell’s approval of a ballot initiation 
                                                     
90 403 P.3d 1132 (Alaska 2017). 
91 Id. at 1139.   
92 Id. at 1134. 
93 Id. at 1134.  
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 1136.  
96 Id. at 1135–36.  
97 Id. at 1137.  
98 [Citation]. 
99 Id. at 1139. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1139. 
102 397 P.3d 312 (Alaska 2017). 
103 Id. at 313. 
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requiring additional legislative approval for a large-scale mining project in Bristol Bay.104 The 
superior court dismissed the action.105 The superior court then moved for a judgment requiring 
Alaska Miners Association to pay the attorneys’ fees and costs of the State because the legal fees 
for the Alaska Miners Association were covered by Pebble Limited Partnership, who had 
significant economic interest in the litigation (despite not being a legal party). The supreme court 
reversed the judgment ordering legal fees, holding the Alaska Miners Association was a 
constitutional claimant, and the actions of Pebble Limited Partnership as a third party were not 
central to that determination.106 The supreme court held that direct economic benefit is required 
in order to prove “sufficient economic incentive,” and the parties do not have to be entirely 
disinterested to constitute constitutional claimants.107 
 
Barber v. State 
In Barber v. State,108 the supreme court held that when both parties fail to timely appeal a final 
order from a superior court, the order becomes the law of the case.109 In 1990, pro se prisoners 
entered into a final settlement agreement with the Department of Corrections following a class 
action lawsuit.110 The Alaska legislature subsequently passed legislation sharply limiting the 
courts’ authority to order prospective relief in actions regarding correctional facility 
conditions.111 Following a motion from the Department to terminate the settlement agreement, 
the superior court ruled in 2001 that the statute required termination of the prospective effect of 
the agreement, but not the agreement itself.112 Neither party appealed that decision.113 From 2013 
to 2015, prisoners filed three different motions under the settlement agreement, but the superior 
court held that the 2001 order misinterpreted the statute and the settlement agreement should 
have been terminated.114 On consolidated appeal, the supreme court reversed, holding that the 
2001 order was the law of the case.115 The supreme court explained that the law of the case 
doctrine forbids a court from reconsidering a final decision made earlier in an existing case.116 
The court reasoned that, while the law of the case doctrine traditionally applies to issues that 
have been adjudicated on appeal, it equally applies to final orders that parties choose not to 
timely appeal.117 The court found that, when the Department did not appeal the 2001 order 
terminating prospective relief but keeping the settlement agreement intact, that order became 
final and the law of the case.118 As a result, the court concluded the superior court does not have 
the authority to relitigate the issue and dismiss the new motions.119 The supreme court reversed 
                                                     
104 Id. at 313. 
105 Id. at 314. 
106 Id. at 316, 318. 
107 Id. at 317. 
108 393 P.3d 412 (Alaska 2017). 
109 Id. at 420. 
110 Id. at 415. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 417. 
115 Id. at 420. 
116 Id. at 419. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
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and remanded, holding that a final order becomes the law of the case when both parties choose 
not to file a timely appeal. 120  
 
Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Gonzalez 
In Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Gonzalez,121 the supreme court held that an insurer’s 
bad faith in delaying payment to plaintiff compelled nominal damages.122 After plaintiff was 
injured in a car accident, she requested payment under the underinsured motorist coverage in the 
policy, but the insurer ignored her repeated requests.123 A few years later, and only after she had 
filed suit against the insurer, the request was reviewed and plaintiff was paid the money.124 The 
superior court found that under Ennen v. Integon Indemnity Corp,125 the jury’s finding that the 
insurer acted in bad faith entitled plaintiff to nominal damages regardless of findings of causation 
and harm.126 On appeal, the insurer argued that awarding nominal damages relieved plaintiff 
from proving causation.127 The supreme court affirmed the lower court on the grounds that 
insurance companies may undermine the purpose of the bad faith cause of action by denying 
coverage arbitrarily and delaying payments with only interest on the amount owed as damage.128 
Overall, when insurer’s act in bad faith in delaying payments, they may be required to pay 
nominal damages regardless of causation and damages.129  
 
Haines v. Comfort Keepers, Inc. 
In Haines v. Comfort Keepers, Inc.130, the supreme court held that: (1) the trial court abused its 
discretion by granting the conditional application for entry of default without giving effect to the 
representative’s want for a jury trial on damages and (2) it was error not to award damages or 
attorney’s fees when allegations of the complaint could have supported an award of punitive 
damages.131 Verna Haines, an elderly woman, hired Comfort Keepers, Inc., an in-home care 
company, to assist with her daily living.132 The assistant they provided stole Haines’s jewelry 
and prescription medicine.133 Haines sued both the company and the assistant for conversion and 
assault, among other charges.134 Eventually, Haines applied for default judgment against the 
assistant, with the condition that damages be decided by a jury trial.135 The lower court granted 
the default but held that the trial on damages would take place without a jury and Haines 
appealed.136 The supreme court of Alaska reasoned that because the right to a jury trial is of 
                                                     
120 Id. at 420. 
121 403 P.3d 1153 (Alaska 2017). 
122 Id. at 1162. 
123 Id. at 1158. 
124 Id.  
125 268 P. 3d 277 (Alaska 2012). 
126 Gonzalez, 403 P.3d at 1162.  
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 1162. 
130 393 P.3d 422 (Alaska 2017). 
131 Id. at 425. 
132 Id. at 426.  
133 Id.  
134 Id.  
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 427. 
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significant importance, it was an abuse of discretion to grant the default without a jury trial.137 
Furthermore, the court reasoned that because the allegations of the complaint included evidence 
of the assistant having malice, bad motives, and reckless indifference to the interest of another 
person, the court concluded it was an error for the lower court to hold that it could award no 
punitive damages.138 The supreme court of Alaska held that: (1) the trial court abused its 
discretion by granting the application for default and (2) it was error to award no damages or 
attorney’s fees when the allegations could have supported an award for punitive damages.139  
 
Hodari v. State, Department of Corrections 
In Hodari v. State, Department of Corrections,140 the supreme court held that if a party fails to 
provide a specific itemization of attorneys’ fees after the paying party has requested one, the 
court can refuse to award any fees it deems too vague or unreasonable.141 Hodari moved to 
recover his legal fees, which he estimated to be $1800 for attorneys’ fees and $3000 for paralegal 
fees, after the State dropped a case against him.142 The superior court granted Hodari’s motion, 
but did not specify how much he was entitled to.143 The State sought a clarification order, which 
the superior court granted, requiring the State to pay the attorneys’ fees but not the paralegal fees 
because Hodari had did not specified—after being asked to do so by the State—which of those 
services constituted work typically done by a lawyer.144 On appeal, Hodari argued that the 
superior court had erred in denying the paralegal’s fees because the paralegal’s time had not been 
itemized, contending that the State had never requested itemization.145 The supreme court 
affirmed the superior court’s decision because it found that the State had requested a detailed list 
of services. Accordingly, the supreme court held that courts may reject any attorneys’ fees for 
vagueness if the party has failed to respond to a request for itemization.146  
 
Hopper v. Estate of Goard 
In Hopper v. Estate of Goard,147 the supreme court held that the denial of two co-conservators’ 
motion to intervene as of right was not harmless error.148 In May 2015, Hopper and Rollins were 
appointed permanent co-conservators for Stahlman, who had recently undergone multiple 
surgeries and been prescribed “extreme narcotic pain medication.”149 Around that time, the co-
conservators learned of a settlement agreement in a dispute between Stahlman and the estate of 
his former business partner.150 The co-conservators moved to reopen and reconsider the 
settlement on the ground that Stahlman’s signature on the agreement could not have been 
                                                     
137 Id. at 428-29.  
138 Id. at 436-37.  
139 Id. at 425.  
140 407 P.3d 468 (Alaska 2017). 
141 Id. at 472–73. 
142 Id. at 469. 
143 Id. at 470. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 472.  
146 Id. at 472–74. 
147 386 P.3d 1245 (Alaska 2017). 
148 Id. at 1248–49. 
149 Id. at 1247. 
150 Id. 
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authentic.151 The trial court treated the motion as one to intervene and denied it.152 On appeal, the 
supreme court explained that although state civil procedure provides for intervention as of right 
if certain factors are met, the supreme court will not review a denial of a motion to intervene that 
was harmless error.153 The supreme court then determined that the co-conservators met the 
factors that (1) the motion be timely, (2) the applicant show an interest in the subject matter of 
the action, (3) the interest may be impaired as a consequence of the action, and (4) the interest is 
not adequately represented by an existing party.154 The supreme court further determined that the 
denial of the motion to intervene was not harmless error because the co-conservators had alleged 
facts that, if proven, would allow them to prevail.155 Reversing the lower court, the supreme 
court held that the co-conservators had a right to intervene.156 
 
Johnson v. Johnson  
In Johnson v. Johnson,157 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the superior court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying an untimely motion to enforce the judgment and a motion for recusal in the 
absence of a showing of bias.158  At the conclusion of her divorce proceedings, Cynthia Johnson 
physically attacked her husband’s attorney as the trial judge read her decision.159  In the criminal 
hearing that followed, the judge that presided over the divorce proceeding testified about the 
events that occurred in her courtroom.160  While incarcerated, Johnson filed a number of motions 
asking the court to reconsider the distribution of the marital estate after she failed to refinance the 
house in compliance with the earlier decision.161  After the court denied these motions, Johnson 
filed a motion for recusal arguing that the judge was biased against her after witnessing 
Johnson’s outbreak at trial.162  The court denied this motion and Johnson appealed.163  On appeal, 
the Alaska Supreme Court applied an abuse of discretion standard of review and affirmed the 
superior court’s rulings.164  
 
Kocurek v. Wagner  
In Kocurek v. Wagner, 165 the supreme court held that the proper standard of review in a motion 
for a partial new trial on the amount of damages is to independently weigh the evidence and 
assess whether the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence.166 In the 1970s or 1980s, 
Kocurek had purchased valuable pre-Columbian artifacts and brought them into the United 
                                                     
151 See id. 
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States.167 Kocurek’s son, Eric, assisted his father with financial matters and was granted power 
of attorney in 2011.168 Eric accepted an offer from Wagner, one of Kocurek’s acquaintances, to 
help execute a complicated plan by which they would sell his father’s artifact collection to the 
United States government without it being confiscated.169 While the plan was ongoing, 
Kocurek’s family moved him to Texas, where he ultimately decided he wanted the artifacts 
returned to him unsold.170 Wagner demanded payment for his services.171 Kocurek sought 
remedy in the superior court, and the jury awarded him $5000 in damages for Wagner’s 
interference with Kocurek’s right to possess the artifact collection without a legal excuse. 
Kocurek moved for a new trial on the amount of damages, and, alternatively, to amend the 
judgment, but the superior court denied his motion.172 On appeal, Kocurek argued that the lower 
court applied the wrong standard of review in rejecting his motion, and that the jury’s $5000 
damage award was against the weight of the evidence.173 The supreme court rejected this 
argument, reasoning that the proper standard of a review in a motion for a new trial or, 
alternatively, to amend a judgment, is for the trial court to independently weigh the evidence and 
use its discretion in deciding whether or not to approve such a motion.174 The court found that 
the trial court had not abused its discretion by finding that the jury’s damage award was not 
against the weight of the evidence. 175 Upholding the lower court’s decision, the supreme court 
held that a superior court may only set aside a verdict and order a new trial if it is in the interest 
of justice because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.176  
 
Larson v. State 
In Larson v. State,177 the court of appeals held that Alaska Appellate Rule 404(f) rule does not 
apply in cases where the appellate court issues a decision on the merits of the petitioner's claim, 
but denies relief.178 Larson filed this current appellate action under Appellate Rule 404 and asked 
the court of appeals to re-open the proceedings in one of his earlier appeals, which the court 
decided in January 2016.179 The court denied Larson's original application for relief in November 
2016, and Larson appealed to get a rehearing of that November 2016 decision.180 Appellate Rule 
404(f) states, “a petition for rehearing of the denial of an original application may not be 
filed.”181 The court of appeals compared the rule to analogous circumstances in petition for 
review cases and found that the appellate court has an interest in ensuring it did not make a 
mistake when resolving the merits of a case.182 Thus, the court of appeals granted Larson’s 
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request for a rehearing and held that Alaska Appellate Rule 404(f) does not prohibit a party from 
seeking rehearing when the appellate court took the case and resolved the merits of a party’s 
claim by denying relief.183 
 
Mattox v. State 
In Mattox v. State,184 the supreme court held that in applying the doctrine of discretionary 
function immunity, the jury did not consider extraneous prejudicial information, because the 
defendant impliedly consented to it by not objecting to the jury instruction.185  While serving a 
prison sentence, Mattox was assaulted by a fellow inmate.186  Prior to the altercation, Mattox 
requested a transfer to another housing module.187  Mattox filed suit against the Department of 
Corrections alleging that it was negligent in not accommodating his request for a transfer.188  At 
trial, the superior court gave a jury instruction that included the doctrine of discretionary function 
immunity.189  After trial, the parties were permitted to conference with the jurors and learned that 
they considered this doctrine in reaching their decision.190  Mattox proceeded to move for a new 
trial on the grounds that the jury improperly considered extraneous prejudicial information.191  
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the lower court’s denial of the motion, holding that the 
doctrine was not extraneous information because it came to the jury through the trial process.192 
 
McAnally v. Thompson  
In McAnally v. Thompson,193 the supreme court held that a defendant’s awareness of the facts 
underlying a claim does not permit a plaintiff to add such a claim after the filing of pleadings 
without leave of the court or consent of the adverse party.194 McAnally was terminated from his 
position as police captain for the City of Houston (City), and sued the City, alleging that his 
termination had been motivated by retailiation for his involvement in investigating city 
leaders.195 The trial was originally set for December 2012 wit the deadline to amend complaints 
in November of 2011.196 After multiple continuances, the trial was set to begin in November 
2013.197 Three weeks before that, McAnally, without moving to amend his complaint, added a 
new claim.198 The trial court dismissed the new claim because it had not been timely pled and the 
City would be substantially prejudiced by forcing to defend a claim introduced late.199 On 
appeal, McAnally argued that the court abused its discretion in dismissing the new claim because 
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the City’s awareness of the facts underlying the claim meant it would not have been substantially 
prejudiced by its addition.200 The supreme court disagreed.201 In holding that the lower court did 
not abuse its discretion, the supreme court reasoned that McAnally was prohibited from pursuing 
the claim without pleading it.202 Alternatively, if  McAnally’s intent was to amend his pleading, 
he would have required leave of the court or written consent of the adverse party since leave was 
sought after a responsive pleading had been filed.203 The supreme court added that the City’s 
awareness of the facts underlying a possible claim does not mean that it would not be prejudiced 
by the court granting leave to amend his complaint three weeks before trial.204 Affirming the 
lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the trial court had acted within its discretion 
when it denied the plaintiff’s motion to add a claim, without leave of the court or consent of the 
defendant, after the deadline to amend pleadings had passed.205  
 
Rae v. State, Dep’t of Corrections  
In Rae v. State, Dep’t of Corrections,206 the supreme court held that a court does not abuse its 
discretion by failing to advise a pro se litigant of substantive legal defects in his complaint before 
dismissing the action sua sponte.207 Rae, an inmate in the custody of the Alaska Department of 
Corrections (DOC), filed a pro se complaint in the superior court alleging that DOC lacked the 
constitutional authority to hold him.208 The superior court dismissed the complaint sua sponte for 
failure to advance a cognizable or discernable claim.209 On appeal, Rae asserted that the superior 
court erred in dismissing his complaint because, as a pro se litigant, his burden of complying 
with procedural rules was “relaxed,” and the court should have advised him of defects in his 
complaint before dismissing the action sua sponte.210 The court reasoned that although the 
pleadings of self-represented litigants should be held to less stringent standards than pleadings of 
lawyers, judges must be careful to maintain impartiality.211 The court noted that a trial judge 
should inform a pro se litigant of proper procedure for an action he is obviously attempting to 
accomplish, but the judge may not act as an advocate for pro se litigants on substantive legal 
issues.212 The court reasoned that Rae’s complaint contained obvious deficiencies that needed 
correction, and that any lenience from the court would go beyond mere procedural asisstance.213 
The court could not advise Rae on how to shape his grievances into cognizable legal claims, 
even if he could have benefited from advice, because it would have crossed the line between 
procedural assistance and substantive legal advice.214 Affirming the superior court, the supreme 
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court held that a trial court is not required to give pro se litigants substantive legal advice to 
support their complaints.215 
 
Reasner v. State 
In Reasner v. State,216 the supreme court held that the lower court erred in granting a motion for 
summary judgment on the grounds that the statute of limitations had tolled, because there was a 
material question of fact regarding when the alleged victim acquired the necessary information to 
alert her of a potential cause of action.217  Reasner was placed in the Office of Children’s 
Services (“OCS”) custody as a child and was subsequently placed with a foster family.218  While 
in foster care, Reasner was repeatedly sexually abused.219  After reaching adulthood, Reasner 
learned that OCS might have been aware of her sexual abuse but nevertheless neglected to 
investigate or address the issue.220  Reasner sued OCS alleging that it negligently handled reports 
of her sexual assault, and as a result allowed the abuse to continue throughout her childhood.221  
At trial, the superior court ruled in favor of OCS on motion for summary judgment, concluding 
that Reasner failed to bring suit within the requisite two year period provided for in the statute of 
limitations for tort claims.222  The supreme court reversed, recognizing that the statute of 
limitations does not start running until a reasonable person would have sufficient information to 
give them notice that they might have a claim.223  There was a material question of fact 
concerning when Reasner acquired such information, and therefore it was improper for the trial 
court to grant the motion for summary judgment.224   
 
Rice v. McDonald 
In Rice v. McDonald, the supreme court held that a trial court must properly consider the 
importance of protecting children from future domestic violence in ceding its jurisdiction over a 
case to a new venue.225 McDonald and his wife had three children, and the children had maternal 
relatives living in Anchorage while their paternal relatives were in Texas.226 The family lived 
together until McDonald killed his wife, was arrested, and pled guilty to his crime.227 Shortly 
after his arrest, McDonald’s sister moved the children from Alaska to Texas and filed a custody 
petition in Texas.228 The next month, Rice, the sister of the deceased mother, filed a separate 
custody petition in Alaska.229 The Alaska court held a telephonic conference with a Texas judge, 
where they discussed the inconvenient forum provision which allows a state with higher priority 
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to cede jurisdiction to a lower priority state if the other state is a more appropriate forum.230 The 
Alaska superior court declined to exercise its jurisdiction, concluding that a court in Texas would 
be a more appropriate forum to make the initial custody determination because most of the 
relevant evidence was in Texas where the children were living.231 On appeal, Rice argued that 
the superior court placed too much weight on the Texas evidence and not enough weight on 
protecting the children from domestic violence.232 The supreme court agreed with Rice, 
reasoning that placing the children with paternal relatives subjected them to potential future 
domestic violence whenever their father was released from prison, while also reasoning that the 
Texas evidence would still be amenable for use in an Alaskan court.233 Vacating the lower 
court’s decision, the supreme court held that a superior court cannot cede its jurisdiction over a 
child custody case without properly considering the potential for future domestic abuse and 
whether evidence located in another state can still be brought into Alaskan court.234 
 
Todeschi v. Sumitomo Metal Mining Pogo, LLC 
In Todeschi v. Sumitomo Metal Mining Pogo, LLC,235 the supreme court held the superior court’s 
refusal to provide an adverse inference jury instruction for an employee, based on the employer’s 
failure to produce certain evidence during discovery, was harmless because the employee was 
permitted to argue in closing arguments that the jury could make adverse inferences based on the 
missing evidence.236 Todeschi was terminated from his employment as mine supervisor 
following his request for accommodation of his back injuries and his renewed pursuit of a three-
year-old workers’ compensation claim.237 He brought suit against the employer, Sumitomo, for 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and unlawful discrimination based on both 
a disability and his workers’ compensation claim,238 and a jury’s special verdict found Sumitomo 
liable only for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.239 On appeal, Todeschi 
argued that the superior court erred when it declined to give an adverse inference jury instruction 
based on alleged spoliation of evidence,240 as his proposed instruction would have instructed the 
jury that if it concluded that Sumitomo’s attorney intentionally deleted emails regarding 
Todeschi’s request for accommodation, it could infer that the deleted emails would have proven 
a discriminatory intent.241 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s holding, reasoning 
that the jury was made well aware that it was free to draw an adverse inference from missing 
evidence as Todeschi was invited to make the same point in closing arguments and a similar jury 
instruction was provided that cautioned the jury in viewing the evidence.242 The court further 
recognized a trial court’s need for flexibility in determining sanctions for discovery violations,243 
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and it declined to decide what a litigant has to show to be entitled to a permissive inference 
instruction under Alaska law.244 Affirming the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held 
the court’s refusal to provide an adverse inference jury instruction for an employee was harmless 
because the employee was permitted to argue in closing arguments that the jury could make 
adverse inferences based on missing evidence.245  
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
Studley v. Alaska Public Offices Commission 
In Studley v. Alaska Public Offices Commission, 246  the supreme court held that hypothetical 
scenarios are an insufficient basis for a constitutional privacy right exemption from the financial 
disclosure requirements a candidate is subject to when running for public office.247 Studley ran as 
a candidate for a local office and was therefore subject to Alaska’s financial disclosure laws, 
requiring Studley to report the “source” of any income over a certain amount.248 Because Studley 
was “self-employed” for purposes of the disclosure laws, the “source” meant including actual 
client names.249 However, Studley did not provide his clients’ names, claiming that it would be 
financially harmful to the clients. 250  Studley alleged that this information was protected by 
providing two hypothetical scenarios to illustrate how disclosure could harm the client.251 The 
Commission concluded that client information was not constitutionally protected and sent Studley 
a Notice of Penalty for failing to file complete disclosure statements.252 Studley appealed the 
penalty, but the Commission issued a Final Order finding that Studley violated the financial 
disclosure requirements and delivering a civil penalty. 253  The superior court affirmed the 
Commission’s decision, finding that Studley had not been required to disclose any confidential 
information.254 On appeal, the supreme court agreed with the Commission’s ultimate decision. The 
supreme court reasoned that to qualify for an exemption to the financial disclosure laws, a 
candidate must provide the necessary facts to prove that an exemption is applicable.255 The court 
further reasoned that Studley’s hypothetical scenarios did not qualify as facts and that Studley did 
not provide any other reason to show that such information was constitutionally protected under a 
zone of privacy. Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that actual facts, not 
hypotheticals, are necessary to qualify for a constitutional privacy right exemption to financial 
disclosure requirements.256 
 
Watson v. State 
In Watson v. State,257 the court of appeals held that the legislature did not violate Alaska’s equal 
protection clause in passing a statute requiring minors charged with misdemeanor traffic offenses 
to be prosecuted as adults.258 Watson was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) when 
she was fourteen years old.259 She was tried as an adult, pursuant to the criminal statute, and 
convicted of DUI in district court.260 On appeal, Watson argued that the legislature violated the 
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equal protection clause by requiring minors who commit traffic misdemeanors to be tried as 
adults because minors who commit traffic felonies are tried as juveniles.261 Watson argued 
further that because minors who commit traffic misdemeanors are as amenable to rehabilitation 
as those who commit traffic felonies, the legislature violated the equal protection clause by 
treating minor misdemeanants and minor felons differently.262 The court of appeals affirmed the 
judgment of the district court, explaining that minors have only a narrow interest in minimizing 
punishment for their offense by being tried as a juvenile.263 The court reasoned, by contrast, that 
the legislature has a strong and valid interest in regulating driving as a dangerous, adult 
activity.264 Moreover, the court reasoned that the legislature may treat minor misdemeanants as 
adults while treating minor felons as juveniles because an adult felony sentence may impose 
significant imprisonment and lifetime legal disabilities.265 Affirming the district court’s 
judgment, the court of appeals held that the legislature did not violate Alaska’s equal protection 
clause by requiring minors charged with traffic misdemeanors to be prosecuted as adults, while 
allowing minors charged with traffic felonies to be prosecuted as juveniles.266 
 
Wielechowski v. State 
In Wielechowski v. State,267 the supreme court held that the 1976 amendment to the Alaska 
Constitution does not give the legislature the authority to dedicate the Permanent Fund 
income.268 In 2016, the legislature appropriated money from the Fund for dividend distributions, 
but the governor vetoed about half of the appropriation and the legislature was unable to override 
the veto.269 Two former and one current legislators sued State and Alaska Permanent Fund 
Corporation, claiming that the legislature’s use of Permanent Fund income was not subject to 
gubernatorial veto since the amendment authorized the legislature to pass laws “dedicating use of 
Permanent Fund income without need for annual appropriations.”270 The superior court disagreed 
and emphasized that even if that were the case, the actual use of the income was subject to 
normal appropriation and veto budgetary processes.271 The supreme court agreed that Permanent 
Fund was not exempt from the anti-dedication clause, as there was no evidence that the voters 
approving the 1976 amendment understood it to be exempt from the Constitution’s anti-
dedication clause, and the plain meaning of the amendment “does not plainly allow the 
legislature to dedicate Permanent Fund income.”272 Thus, the Permanent Fund income was held 
to be subject annual appropriations and gubernatorial veto.273 
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CRIMINAL LAW 
 
Adams v. State 
In Adams v. State,274 the court of appeals held that even when the police have violated an 
arrested suspect’s right to counsel, his subsequent statements are still admissible if the 
government shows that those statements were both initiated by the suspect and not tainted by the 
preceding violation.275 Adams was arrested on suspicion that he murdered his wife.276 At the 
police station two police officers decided to speak to Adams and ascertain whether Adams 
wished to invoke his right to counsel, even though the two police officers had heard from a third 
police officer that Adams had already invocated this right.277 When the two police officers 
entered the interview room, Adams told them that he thought he needed an attorney, but also that 
he wanted to talk to one of the police officers alone.278 Then Adams described the events that 
preceded his arrest to the police officer that he asked to speak with.279 Based in part on these 
statements, Adams was convicted of first-degree murder and tampering with evidence.280 On 
appeal, Adams contended that his statements should have been suppressed because the police 
violated his Fifth Amendment right to counsel when they decided to speak to Adams in the 
interview room.281 The court disagreed. 282 The court explained that Fifth Amendment doctrine 
holds that when an arrested suspect expresses his desire to deal with the police only through 
counsel, the suspect must not be subjected to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel 
has been made available to him, unless the suspect himself initiates further communication, 
exchanges, or conversations with the police.283 While the court of appeals assumed arguendo that 
the police officers violated Adams’ rights by initiating contact with him, it held that this violation 
did not taint Adams’ ensuing interview with the police officer because Adams expressly asked 
one of the police officers to stay behind and converse.284 Affirming the lower court, the court of 
appeals held that even when the police have violated an arrested suspect’s right to counsel, his 
resulting statements are still admissible if the government shows that those statements were both 
initiated by the suspect and not tainted by the preceding violation.285  
 
Coleman v. State 
In Coleman v. State,286 the court of appeals held that a bicycle storage shed qualifies as a 
building for the purposes of Alaska’s burglary statute,287 and that a conviction for making a false 
report requires a reasonable likelihood that police would act and expend resources on a false 
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claim.288 In the case at issue, Coleman was convicted by jury for second degree burglary of two 
bicycles from a commercial bike shop’s storage shed,289 and for making a false report to police 
that his van was stolen.290 On appeal, Coleman argued that the shed was too small to qualify as a 
building under Alaska’s burglary statute, considering that a normal sized person would have to 
stoop to go inside the structure, and thus the shed would not “’comfortably accommodate people 
moving around’ in it.”291 The court of appeals upheld the burglary conviction, explaining that the 
shed was a building based on the term’s ordinary definition, since the shed had four walls, a 
floor, a roof, a fixed entry way,292 and was large enough for a person to “physically enter and 
occupy.”293 Coleman also argued on appeal that his false statement that his van was stolen did 
not qualify as a false report since he made the statement in response to police questioning and 
did not expect the police to act on that information.294 The court of appeals reversed the false 
report conviction, explaining that a false report requires more than a making a passive false 
statement to police.295 The court of appeals held that a bicycle storage shed qualifies as a 
building for the purposes of conviction under Alaska’s burglary statute,296 and that a false report 
conviction requires a reasonable likelihood that police would act and expend resource based on a 
false statement.297 
 
Dirks v. State 
In Dirks v. State,298 the court of appeals held that an individual cannot be convicted on a theory 
of constructive possession of a gun merely because he was aware of the presence of the gun.299 
After a jury trial, Dirks was convicted of fourth-degree weapons misconduct for possessing a 
holstered gun while impaired by alcohol.300 Dirk was driving his car while his friend was sitting 
in the front passenger seat and his friend’s gun was lying on the backseat.301 The State’s theory 
of prosecution was that Dirks possessed the gun because he was aware that the gun was inside 
his car at the time.302 Although the court of appeals did not question that Dirks knew the gun was 
in the car, it reversed his conviction because the government had nevertheless failed to prove 
possession.303 The court noted that possession can be actual or constructive—that is, control or 
dominion over the property in question.304 However, constructive possession is not proved 
simply by knowledge or awareness of the property.305 The court found that such a theory would 
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be overly broad.306 Therefore, reversing Dirks’s conviction, the court of appeals held that 
knowledge or awareness of property alone is not sufficient to prove possession.307 
 
Hart v. State 
In Hart v. State,308 the Court of Appeals of Alaska held that a trial judge could reasonably rely on 
statements made by two drug dealers to a reliable police informant when the drug dealers did not 
know the individual was a police informant and were unaware that their statements would be 
provided to the police.309 Hart was convicted of two counts of misconduct involving a controlled 
substance for possession of heroin and related paraphernalia.310 Statements from the two drug 
dealers about Hart were used, in combination with other evidence, to obtain a search warrant.311 
On appeal, Hart moved to suppress evidence gained by a search warrant issued in part on 
statements two drug dealers made to a reliable police informant, claiming the two drug dealers 
did not meet the credibility and reliability requirements of the Aguilar/Spinelli test for probably 
cause.312 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, relying on its reasoning in 
State v. Malkin313 that a secondary source has no motive to lie when making statements that he 
has no reason to believe will eventually reach police and can therefore be reasonably relied on as 
a credible informant for purposes of finding the probable cause necessary to issue a search 
warrant.314 The court noted that the two drug dealers thought they were engaged in a genuine 
drug transaction and would therefore be likely to make factually reliable statements.315 
Additionally, the information obtained from the two drug dealers was consistent with other 
information the police detective had provided to obtain the search warrant.316 Affirming the 
lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a trial judge could reasonably rely on 
statements two drug dealers made to a reliable police informant when the drug dealers did not 
know the individual was a police informant and were unaware that their statements would be 
provided to the police.317 
 
Johnson v. State 
In Johnson v. State,318 the court of appeals held that a conviction for first-degree stalking that 
requires a course of conduct must involve repeated acts of contact that are non-consensual.319 
Johnson was convicted in the superior court for first-degree stalking, which requires the State to 
prove that Johnson had engaged in a “course of conduct” that reasonably placed the victim of 
fear of death or physical injury, and that Johnson had acted recklessly as to whether the course of 
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conduct would have this result.320 Over several weeks, Johnson had had consensual interactions 
with a young boy under the age of sixteen.321 During this time, the boy never suggested that the 
interactions were non-consensual or caused him to fear injury or death.322 Later, the boy’s 
mother and police took away the boy’s cellphone, which Johnson was using to contact him via 
text message.323 The boy’s mother also told the boy that Johnson had previously been convicted 
of molesting a child, which the boy testified was scary and forced him to retrospectively 
reconsider his previous course of consensual contacts.324 The police, posing as the boy, carried 
on the text messages with Johnson for three weeks.325 Johnson appealed the conviction for legal 
insufficiency of evidence.326 The State argued that either the actual interactions between Johnson 
and the boy or the text messages from Johnson to the boy’s phone, possessed by police, could 
qualify as a “course of conduct” in violation of the statute.327 The court of appeals disagreed. 328 
Noting that a “course of conduct” to satisfy the statute required repeated acts of non-consensual 
contact,329 the court ruled that the State had not satisfied its burden.330 The contacts between 
Johnson and the boy, although repeated, were consensual, and the court said that the boy’s 
retrospective re-evaluation did not alter that.331 Further, the contacts between Johnson and the 
police, posing as the boy, could likewise not be non-consensual because the boy never actually 
conveyed non-consent, nor was he even aware of the messages.332 The court of appeals thus held 
that a conviction for first-degree stalking requires the state to prove that the defendant engaged in 
repeated acts with the victim that the victim considered non-consensual.333  
 
Kim v. State 
In Kim v. State,334 the court of appeals held that it was not plain error for the prosecutor to ask a 
criminal defendant if he was lying or if the State’s witness against him was lying.335 Kim was 
convicted of third-degree theft for stealing a laptop from the University of Alaska and falsely 
reporting to the police that the laptop had been stolen from him.336 On appeal, he raised multiple 
claims of plain error, including that the prosecutor behaved improperly when she asked Kim on 
the stand if he was telling the truth or if the State’s witness, who offered testimony that Kim gave 
him the laptop as collateral for a loan, was lying.337 The court of appeals recognized that so-
called “were they lying?” questions offer little probative value because the witness must 
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speculate about another’s state of mind, they are designed to make the defendant witness look 
bad, they ignore other possible reasons for discrepancies aside from lying, they infringe on the 
factfinder’s task of deciding whether the State has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and they are argumentative.338 While declining to offer a bright-line rule as to the 
appropriateness of “were they lying?” questions, the court found that because Kim’s testimony 
and that of the State’s witness could not be reconciled, the question in this case was not 
prejudicial.339 Therefore, the court held that asking a criminal defendant if  he was lying or if the 
State’s witness against him was lying did not rise to the level of plain error.340 
 
Maguire v. State 
In Maguire v. State,341 the court of appeals held that five years of probation for failure to comply 
with child-support obligations for fifteen years is not excessive.342 Maguire continuously failed to 
comply with child-support obligations for fifteen years and, after accepting a plea agreement for 
misdemeanor criminal contempt, the sentencing court imposed five years of probation for 
Maguire.343 The sentencing judge found that Maguire had consciously opted to disregard the child-
support obligations.344 On appeal, Maguire argued that a five-year probationary sentence for this 
misdemeanor offense is excessive due to his lack of criminal history, older age, and the lack of an 
ability to be properly rehabilitated if on probation.345 The court of appeals disagreed, noting that 
this probationary period was necessary to deter others from similar conduct, motivate Maguire to 
pay the child-support, and affirm community values that one must work as hard as one needs to 
meet obligations for one’s children. 346  The court reasoned that this probationary period was 
appropriate so that Maguire could rehabilitate himself without confinement. 347 Affirming the 
sentencing court, the court of appeals held that a five-year probationary period for persistent and 
long-term failure to pay child support is not excessive.348 
 
McCord v. State 
In McCord v. State,349 the court of appeals held that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right 
to question the analyst who conducts lab tests admitted into evidence in her case.350 McCord was 
convicted of driving under the influence though her blood alcohol level was not over the statutory 
limit.351 At the time of arrest, McCord’s blood showed the presence of four medications, one of 
which—clonazepam—is a controlled substance. 352  At trial, the State proved the presence of 
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clonazepam through the testimony of Noble, a forensic toxicologist.353 Noble conducted the initial 
drug screening of McCord’s blood sample, but another analyst, Swenson, performed the test that 
confirmed the presence and concentration of clonazepam.354 Swenson was unavailable to testify 
and thus Noble reviewed Swenson’s results and testified regarding the final results.355 On appeal, 
the court of appeals explained that under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, the 
government is required to present live testimony from the laboratory technician who tested the 
substance at issue. 356  The court of appeals reversed, holding that a criminal defendant’s 
confrontation clause rights are violated when she is unable to question the analyst who conducted 
lab tests used by the prosecution.357  
 
Municipality of Anchorage v. Brooks 
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Brooks,358 the court of appeals held that a sentencing statute based 
on prior convictions applies to defendants with one or more prior convictions. 359  AS 
12.55.135(a)(1)(C) is a sentencing statute stating that past criminal convictions for crimes similar 
to the offense raise the maximum penalty for a class A misdemeanor from 30 days to one year 
imprisonment.360 Brooks was charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence, a crime 
for which he had one prior conviction.361 The district court ruled that Brooks was not covered by 
subsection (1)(C) because he had only a single prior conviction and the statutory language states 
“convictions” in the plural form.362 The court of appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, 
reasoning that the plain or ordinary meaning of the word “convictions” includes the singular 
form.363 The court also noted that the Alaska legislature has enacted a statute stating that words in 
plural form include the singular form.364 Additionally, legislative history from the House Judiciary 
Committee confirms the legislature’s intent for the provision to apply to one or more prior 
convictions.365 The court states that this persuasive legislative history negates the applicability of 
the rule of lenity to this question of statutory construction. 366  Reversing the district court’s 
decision, the court of appeals held that a sentencing statute based on prior convictions applies to 
defendants with one or more prior convictions.367 
 
Olson v. State 
In Olson v. State,368 the court of appeals held that while the probative value of an unredacted 
version of a restraining order was substantially outweighed by its danger of unfairly prejudicing 
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the defendant, this error was harmless.369 Olson’s wife obtained a domestic violence protective 
order against Olson.370 After Olson was found within a quarter mile of his wife’s residence, 
Olson was charged with violating the protective order.371 At trial, over the defense attorney’s 
objection, the trial judge allowed the prosecutor to introduce a copy of the restraining order that 
identified that the judge who issued the restraining order found probable cause to believe Olson 
had committed, or had attempted to commit, assault or reckless endangerment, stalking, and 
some unspecified sexual offense, as well as criminal mischief and criminal trespass.372 The trial 
judge reasoned that the restraining order had sufficient probative value because it showed that 
the restraining order was valid and that the trial judge had probable cause to issue it.373 On 
appeal, the court of appeals held that restraining order’s probative value was not sufficient 
because the parties did not dispute the validity of the restraining order.374 After all, the court 
reasoned, Olson told the trial judge that he would stipulate that the restraining order was valid.375 
The court further found that, while the trial judge abused its discretion by allowing the 
prosecutor to introduce this evidence, this error was harmless because the trial judge issued 
cautionary instructions to the jury to disregard the allegations referenced on the restraining order 
multiple times throughout the trial. Affirming the judgment of the lower court, the court of 
appeals held that while the unredacted version of a restraining order’s probative value was 
substantially outweighed by its danger of unfairly prejudicing the defendant, the trial judge’s 
abuse of discretion was harmless.376  
 
Rask v. State 
In Rask v. State,377 the court of appeals held that an intoxicated driver was denied his due process 
rights when the police provided him with incorrect and misleading implied consent warnings 
telling him that he could refuse a chemical breath test without criminal penalties as long as he 
agreed to submit to a chemical blood test.378 Anchorage Police Officers escorted Rask, who was 
visibly impaired, to a hospital after he drove his car into a pole in the early morning of 2011 and 
later arrested him when he left the hospital while they were seeking a warrant to test his blood 
for controlled substances.379 Although a portable breath test administered by hospital staff 
measured Rask’s blood-alcohol content at 0.00 percent and the officers had secured a warrant to 
test his blood, the officers asked Rask if he was willing to submit to an additional breath test 
without explaining that it was a crime for him to refuse to do so, and he subsequently refused.380 
Following a jury trial, the trial court convicted Rask of felony refusal to submit to a breath test, 
accepting the State’s argument that an independent test advertisement the officers read to Rask 
after he had refused the breath test cured any deficiencies in their earlier advertisements.381 On 
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appeal, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in finding the advertisements read to 
Rask adequate for purposes of assuring his due process rights, as the independent test 
advertisement was read to Rask after he had already refused to submit to the breath test.382 The 
court of appeals stressed the severity of the criminal consequences of refusing a blood test, and 
reasoned that due process required care to be taken so that Rask had adequate notice of his legal 
duty to take the breath test.383 Reversing the trial court’s decision, the court of appeals held Rask 
was denied his due process rights when the police provided him with incorrect and misleading 
implied consent warnings telling him that he could refuse a chemical breath test without criminal 
penalties as long as he agreed to submit to a chemical blood test.384 
 
Roberts v. State 
In Roberts v. State385, the court held that: (1) an error in failing to instruct the jury on requirement 
of a unanimous decision was cured by a polling of jurors and (2) restriction of defense counsel’s 
explanation of the four burdens of proof on grounds it would confuse the jury was a harmless 
error.386  Roberts pleaded no contest to eight counts of flying an aircraft without a license, and 
after a jury trial he was additionally convicted of one count of unlawful possession or 
transportation of game.387 Roberts challenged his conviction on appeal, arguing the trial court 
committed error when it failed to instruct the jury about a unanimous decision requirement, and 
that the trial judge improperly restricted his attorney’s closing argument when he precluded the 
attorney from contrasting the “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden with the lesser burdens of proof 
used in other types of proceedings.388 The Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, 
reasoning that although the trial judge should have instructed the jurors their decision needed to 
be unanimous, the judge individually polling the jurors rendered this error harmless.389 The court 
further reasoned that although it was error for the judge to prohibit the defense attorney from 
contrasting the burdens, this error was rendered harmless because the defense attorney was able to 
address the same concept using other phrasings.390 The Court of Appeals of Alaska affirmed the 
lower court by holding that: (1) an error in failing to instruct the jury on requirement of a 
unanimous decision was cured by a polling of jurors and (2) restriction of defense counsel’s 
explanation of the four burdens of proof on grounds it would confuse the jury was harmless 
error.391 
 
Rossiter v. State 
In Rossiter v. State392, the Alaska Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and held that the 
inflammatory and misleading nature of the prosecutor’s closing argument required reversal of 
defendant’s conviction.393 Devin Rossiter was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing a 
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man.394 At Mr. Rossiter’s trial, his attorney argued that he should be acquitted because he acted in 
self-defense. 395  The prosecutor’s closing argument included the following language: “Nick 
Stachelrodt did not deserve to die [for pulling Rossiter out of the car]. The only way that you can 
find [that] the defendant is not guilty of murder in the second degree is if you disagree with that 
premise —that Nick Stachelrodt did not deserve to die for what he did.”396 The court reasoned that 
because the availability of self-defense does not hinge on whether the deceased “deserved to die,” 
the argument was impermissible and the conviction should be overturned.397 The Alaska Court of 
Appeals reversed the defendant’s murder conviction and held that the inflammatory and 
misleading nature of the prosecutor’s closing argument required reversal of defendant’s 
conviction.398 
 
Silook v. State  
In Silook v. State,399 the court of appeals held that the statutory prohibition of rendering 
assistance to a person who has committed a felony only applies to physical or material forms of 
assistance and does not include lying to the police.400  In 2009, Silook’s three-year old daughter 
started suffering a series of physical injuries when left in the care of Silook’s live-in-boyfriend, 
Michael Ponte.401  These injuries culminated in November of that year when Ponte was looking 
after the young child while her mother was running errands.402  When she returned, Ponte 
informed her that he had bathed the child and put her to bed.403  Later that night, the child began 
seizing and was rushed to the hospital with serious injuries.404  When police later interviewed 
Silook about the incident, she lied by telling the officer that she was the one taking care of her 
daughter that night, not Ponte.405  Silook was convicted of first-degree hindering prosecution, 
and appealed her conviction.406  The appellate court reasoned that the trial court misinterpreted 
the statute, and reversed the conviction.407  Legislative history shows that the state legislature did 
not intend for the statute to encompass all forms of assistance within the ordinary meaning of the 
word, and instead envisioned a definition for assistance that would include only those acts 
explicitly specified within the subsections of the act.408  The appellate court held that the statute 
criminalizing rendering assistance to a person who has committed a felony only prohibits 
physical and material methods of assistance.409  
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State v. Jouppi 
In State v. Jouppi,410 the Court of Appeals of Alaska held any vehicle that is knowingly used in 
an endeavor to introduce alcoholic beverages into a local option community must be subject to 
forfeiture, regardless of whether the alcoholic beverages ever physically arrived in the 
community.411 Alaska State Troopers seized various boxes of beer from Jouppi’s airplane, which 
was scheduled to fly to Beaver, a local option village, in April 2012, and, following a jury trial, 
Jouppi and Ken Air, LLC, the legal owner of the airplane, were convicted of importation of 
alcoholic beverages into a local option community. 412 At sentencing, however, the district court 
denied the State’s request to order forfeiture of the airplane, concluding that the law did not 
authorize, much less mandate, the forfeiture of the airplane.413 On appeal, Jouppi argued that the 
legislature only intended to allow forfeiture in the most serious cases where alcoholic beverages 
are actually delivered into local option communities.414 The appellate court reversed the lower 
court’s ruling on the issue of airplane forfeiture, concluding that the legislature intended to 
punish all aspects of any endeavor to bring alcoholic beverages into a local option community.415 
Although the court acknowledged that the plain language of the statute at issue would seem to 
demand otherwise, it reasoned that the legislative history and the greater regulatory scheme 
around the statute indicated courts were required to order forfeiture of any airplane involved in 
such an endeavor.416 Reversing the lower court’s ruling on the forfeiture issue, the appellate 
court held any vehicle that is knowingly used in an endeavor to introduce alcoholic beverages 
into a local option community must be subject to forfeiture, regardless of whether the alcoholic 
beverages ever physically arrive in the community.417 
 
State v. Wright 
In State v. Wright,418 the supreme court held that an accused individual’s speedy trial right was 
not violated because he was primarily responsible for the presumptively prejudicial delay due to 
leaving the state upon realizing he was under investigation.419 Sean Wright was accused of 
sexually abusing two young girls and moved away when the investigation began.420 Wright 
worked construction jobs in several states under his real name and passed various background 
tests while obtaining security clearances.421 In evaluating the potential violation of Wright’s 
speedy trial rights under the four-factor balancing test established in Barker v. Wingo,422 the 
court of appeals found that the superior court has misapplied the test because, although Wright 
was partially responsible for the delay due to leaving the state, the State did not avail itself of 
available methods of locating him that would have been effective in producing him, including 
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issuing an extraditable warrant.423 The supreme court reversed the appellate court’s decision, 
finding that in applying the balancing test, the relative responsibility for a delay must weigh 
heavily against an individual who flees a state to avoid prosecution.424 The balance is not altered 
because the government was potentially negligent in its efforts to apprehend him.425 The court 
reasoned that although the state failed to obtain an extraditable warrant, Wright’s flight was the 
primary cause of the trial delay.426 Reversing the appellate court’s holding and affirming the 
superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that an accused individual’s speedy trial right 
was not violated because he was primarily responsible for the presumptively prejudicial delay 
due to leaving the state upon realizing he was under investigation.427 
 
Taylor v. State 
In Taylor v. State,428 the court of appeals held that a factual unanimity instruction requiring the 
jury to unanimously agree on the theory upon which a crime was committed is not required to 
uphold a criminal conviction.429 On May 15, 2012, two Anchorage police officers witnessed a 
Suburban vehicle failing to stop at a red light and then activated their patrol car’s overhead lights 
to pursue the vehicle.430 The police officers pursued the Suburban, which accelerated away from 
the officers at speeds of up to 70 miles per hour despite driving in residential areas and alleys 
with speed limits of 25 to 30 mile per hour.431 After allegedly hitting an unattended Nissan 
Maxima, the Suburban then back up and collided with the officers’ patrol car.432 The state 
charged defendant Taylor with felony eluding, which requires that the motorist fails to stop at the 
order of a police officer, and that the motorists commits one of four aggravating factors including 
reckless driving and causing an accident.433 On appeal, Taylor argued that since the trial judge 
amended the jury instructions to allow the jury to convict on either a reckless driving or accident 
theory, and the jury did not reach unanimity upon the validity of either of the two theories, that 
his conviction should be reversed.434 The court of appeals upheld the conviction, reasoning that a 
single crime that could be committed in different ways does not require a jury to be unanimous 
on which of the ways the crime was committed.435 Instead, the court explained that both reckless 
driving and the collision with the patrol car were alternative theories the jury could use to convict 
Taylor for felony alluding.436 Affirming the jury’s verdict, the court of appeals held that a jury 
does not need to unanimously agree on the particular theory upon which a crime was committed 
in order to convict.437 
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Tofelogo v. State 
In Tofelogo v. State,438 the court of appeals held that the statutory aggravating factor for felonies 
involving domestic abuse did not apply to a defendant who killed a roommate with whom he 
shared no family connection or emotional relationship.439 Tofelogo lived in a treatment group 
home, and he shared a room with the victim, Fathke.440 On the day in question, both Tofelogo 
and Fathke were in their room.441 Tofelogo, pretending to be a ninja, executed a martial arts 
move with a long-bladed knife and accidently inflicted Fathke with a fatal wound.442 Tofelogo 
later pled guilty to criminally negligent homicide.443 When imposing the sentence, the superior 
court judge gave weight to aggravator (c)(18)(A)—i.e., to the fact that Tofelogo and Fathke were 
roommates.444 Tofelogo appealed, arguing that the underlying rational of aggravator (c)(18)(A) 
did not apply to the facts of his case.445 The court of appeals held that aggravator (c)(18)(A) is 
based on the policy rational of “altering various provisions of law to facilitate the prosecution 
and punishment of crimes that occur between people who are involved with or related to each 
other in specified ways.”446 Because Tofelogo and Fathke’s roommate relationship fell outside 
the scope of aggravator (c)(18)(A), the court of appeals found that the superior court erred by 
giving any weight to the aggravating factor.447 Directing the superior court to re-sentence 
Tofelogo, the court of appeals held that that the statutory aggravating factor for felonies 
involving domestic abuse did not apply to a defendant who killed a roommate with whom he 
shared no family connection or emotional relationship.448 
 
Treptow v. State 
In Treptow v. State,449 the court of appeals held that under Criminal Rule 23(a), for both felony 
and misdemeanor cases, defendant can waive jury trial only when the government consents and 
court approves the waiver.450 Defendant was charged with felony driving under the influence due 
to his two prior DUI convictions within the past decade: one in Arizona, the other in Alaska.451 
On appeal, defendant argued that his Arizona DUI conviction was not a “prior convictions” for 
purposes of Alaska’s felony DUI law because for felony and misdemeanor cases in Arizona, the 
waiver of jury trial requires the approval of both the government and court, whereas in Alaska, 
defendants in misdemeanor cases have an “absolute right” to demand a bench trial.452 The court 
of appeals found this to be a “misreading” of Alaska Criminal Rule 23(a).453 The second 
sentence of Rule 23(a) states that in felony cases, the waiver must: (1) be in writing; (2) have 
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court approval; and (3) have state’s consent. While the third sentence states that in misdemeanor 
cases, the waiver can be either “in writing” or “made on the record in open court.”454 Despite 
defendant’s interpretation that the third sentence–(i.e. the requirements for misdemeanor cases)–
does not include the requirements of the second sentence, the court emphasized that another 
reasonable interpretation was that the rule “simply relaxed” the writing requirement that governs 
waivers.455 To resolve the ambiguity in interpretation, the court looked towards the legislative 
history and intent of the drafters.456 First, the court noted Alaska Criminal Rule 23(a) is rooted in 
the corresponding federal rule that governed Alaska’s criminal trials in the territorial days, which 
required the waiver be in writing with the consent of both the government and court.457 However, 
Rule 23(a) relaxes the “writing” requirement for misdemeanor cases to take into account District 
Court Criminal Rule 1(d), which allows waivers to be made orally on the record.458 Furthermore, 
the court administrative staff did not intend to change substantive criminal law–they simply 
sought to meld District Court Criminal Rule 1(d) with Alaska Rule 23(a).459 Thus, affirming the 
lower court, the court of appeals rejected defendant’s argument that his Arizona DUI convictions 
do not count as “prior convictions” for Alaska’s determination if he was guilty of a felony or 
misdemeanor since both Arizona and Alaska have the same requirements for the waiver of a jury 
trial for felony and misdemeanor cases: that the waiver be in writing with the approval of both 
the government and court.460 
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
 
Alexie v. State 
In Alexie v. State,461 the court of appeals held that summary judgment is inappropriate where a 
defendant’s post-conviction claim that he did not understand his plea agreement is controverted 
only by his colloquy with the sentencing judge and competing affidavits, which thereby present a 
dispute of material fact.462 Alexie pled guilty at a change-of-plea hearing upon the advice of his 
attorney.463 However, Alexie submitted an application after sentencing for post-conviction relief 
seeking to withdraw his plea.464 Alexie claimed that his attorney had not provided sufficient 
explanation of the plea—particularly, how much time he would actually serve and the nature of 
the offense to which he was pleading guilty.465  The superior court summarily dismissed Alexie’s 
application finding that his claims were inconsistent with the change-of-plea hearing record.466 
On appeal, the State argued that Alexie’s claims were patently false, and therefore need not be 
accepted by a court making a summary judgment decision, because they were contradicted by his 
responses during his colloquy with the sentencing court regarding the knowingness and 
voluntariness of his plea.467 The court of appeals disagreed, finding instead that the dispute was 
between competing affidavits—of Alexie and his attorney—and was therefore a question of 
witness credibility.468 Where there are contested material facts, the court of appeals added, 
summary judgment is inappropriate because the court must hear the evidence to determine which 
assertions of fact are more credible.469 As such, there remained a dispute of material fact and the 
court of appeals remanded Alexie’s application for post-conviction relief because a colloquy was 
not alone sufficient to create an absence of dispute of material fact.470  
 
Berezyuk v. State of Alaska 
In Berezyuk v. State of Alaska,471 the court of appeals held that evidence of prior convictions 
cannot be introduced in court if the evidence is meant to prove the character of the defendant; 
such evidence can only be introduced for non-propensity purposes.472 After being found with 
heroin and other drug paraphernalia, Berezyuk was charged with second-degree substance 
misconduct (among other charges).473 During trial, the prosecutor introduced evidence of his 
prior drug conviction, purportedly to convince the jury of Berezyuk’s intent to distribute.474 The 
trial court did not explain the non-propensity uses of the evidence when allowing it.475 After the 
prosecutor repeatedly referenced the prior conviction as evidence that Berezyuk was a known 
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drug dealer, the jury convicted Berezyuk of second-degree substance misconduct.476 The court of 
appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction because the prosecutor had plainly used the prior 
convictions to show Berezyuk’s propensity for dealing drugs.477 The court noted that the trial 
court had improperly applied a test that allows for the introduction of character evidence, 
notwithstanding the evidentiary rules’ prohibition against character evidence.478 Rather, the court 
of appeals determined, the trial court was required to exclude the evidence because the 
prosecutor had not in fact introduced it for a non-propensity purpose. Reversing Berezyuk’s 
conviction, the court of appeals held that information regarding prior convictions can only be 
admissible if the prosecutor introduces it for a non-propensity purpose.479  
 
Brown v. State 
In Brown v. State,480 the court of appeals held that a grand jury indictment will not be dismissed 
even when one grand juror is biased unless the defendant can show that the rest of the panel 
became biased by the grand juror.481 Brown was indicted for thefts from a Kenai store.482 
During the grand jury proceeding, the prosecutor asked the grand jurors if any of them knew 
anyone involved in the case.483 When one of the grand jurors stated that she was an employee at 
the store, another grand juror called out “[g]uilty,”484 and several other grand jurors laughed. 
Brown’s motion to dismiss the indictment was denied. 485 On appeal, Brown argued that the 
“guilty” comment demonstrated that the grand juror was biased and therefore tainted the entire 
grand jury panel.486 Brown added that the indictment should have been dismissed because the 
prosecutor failed to admonish the grand juror or provide a curative instruction to the rest of the 
panel.487 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.488 While noting that the grand 
juror’s comment was improper, the court noted that the burden was on Brown to prove not only 
that the commenting grand juror was biased, but also that the bias affected other grand jurors, 
and that this had to be shown with particularity.489 The court found no evidence that the single 
grand juror’s comment significantly influenced the other grand jurors.490 Therefore, the court  
found no legitimate basis for imputing the bias of the grand juror to the entire grand jury.  
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a defendant must show that  
one grand juror’s demonstrated bias furthermore biased the other grand jurors in order for an 
indictment to be dismissed.491 
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Brown v. State 
In Brown v. State,492 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that combat-related post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) could be used by a former soldier as grounds on which to mitigate his prison 
sentence.493 The defendant had previously served two tours in the U.S. military.494 Expert 
testimony indicated that he suffered from PTSD from his combat experience in Iraq, as well as 
from a sexual assault during his second tour in Kuwait.495 Alaskan law specifically allows 
combat-related PTSD to be used as a mitigating factor for certain offenses during sentencing.496 
At trial, the defendant pleaded guilty to distribution of child porn.497 The superior court judge 
concluded that the viewing of child pornography did not relate to any combat-related PTSD 
suffered by the defendant, because it was only related to the incident in Kuwait.498 On this basis, 
the superior court judge did not apply the mitigator to the defendant’s sentence.499 On appeal, the 
Court found that the superior court erred in rejecting the proposed mitigator because the 
defendant’s PTSD associated with his service in Kuwait was considered combat-related, based 
on the plain meaning and legislative history of the mitigation statute.500 The defendant’s post-
traumatic stress from the sexual assault in Kuwait was “combat-related,” and the court remanded 
the case for resentencing with the defendant’s proposed mitigator.501 Thus, combat-related PTSD 
could be used by a former soldier as grounds on which to mitigate his prison sentence.502  
 
Ghosh v. State 
In Ghosh v. State,503 the court of appeals held that a criminal defendant does not waive all 
objections to his sentence if he offers his guilty plea based on a reasonable, but materially 
different, understanding of the plea agreement from the judge and prosecution.504 Ghosh entered 
into a plea agreement designed to restrict the court’s sentencing authority, which provided for a 
“jail range” of a maximum of 3.5 years.505 The judge and prosecution interpreted the phrase “jail 
range” to refer to Ghosh’s active term of imprisonment, distinct from any additional suspended 
term he might receive.506 The judge sentenced Ghosh to 3.5 years of active imprisonment, plus 
an additional 3.5 years suspended.507 Ghosh’s attorney challenged the sentence as outside the 
range permitted by the agreement, based on his understanding that the term “jail range” meant 
Ghosh’s total term of imprisonment.508 Ghosh moved to alter the sentence to reflect his 
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attorney’s interpretation of the agreement, which the trial court denied.509 The court reasoned 
that Ghosh had waived any claim that his sentence did not conform to the terms of the agreement 
by failing to object or take any other action until after the sentence was announced.510 On appeal, 
the court of appeals reasoned that there was no judicial finding regarding Ghosh’s own 
understanding of the agreement, and that if Ghosh pled believing that his total sentence could not 
exceed 3.5 years, he had not received the benefit of the bargain as he understood it.511 The court 
of appeals determined that Ghosh was therefore entitled to raise the issue.512 Vacating and 
remanding to the superior court for further proceedings, the court of appeals held that a criminal 
defendant does not waive all objections to his sentence from a plea agreement if he offers his 
pleas based on an objectively reasonable but different interpretation of the agreement.513  
 
Jeter v. State 
In Jeter v. State,514 the court of appeals held that when defendants who are on probation commit 
a new crime and receive a sentence for their new crime plus probation revocation sentences 
based on the same crime, these sentences can be appealed individually.515 While on probation in 
two criminal cases, Jeter committed a third crime.516 Jeter received one sentence in the new 
criminal case and probation revocation sentences in the two earlier cases. 517 Jeter appealed the 
lower court’s revocation of his probation, but not the new third sentence. 518 The court of appeals 
initially affirmed the lower court, stating that proper sentencing review requires assessing the 
entirety of a defendant’s convictions and conduct as a whole. 519 However, on rehearing, the 
court of repeals disavowed its earlier decision.520 The court emphasized that while a composite 
sentence approach to sentence review may make sense when the same judge imposes the 
sentences, under Alaska law different judges will typically preside over probation revocation 
proceedings and criminal defendants’ new criminal cases, and these sentencing evaluations will 
typically be performed at different times.521 Amending its earlier decision, the court of appeals 
held that when defendants on probation are convicted of a new crime, defendants can appeal 
their sentences for a new crime and their probation revocation sentences individually.522  
 
Jordan v. State 
In Jordan v. State,523 the court of appeals held that a defendant’s personal consent is not required 
for the State to dismiss a charge with prejudice after the trial has begun in a criminal 
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prosecution.524 Anchorage police officers arrested and charged Jordan with assault, among other 
offenses.525 At trial, the State sought to dismiss the assault charge with prejudice because the 
State could not locate two witnesses.526 Jordan’s defense attorney consented to the dismissal and 
the State dismissed the charge with prejudice.527 A jury then convicted Jordan of the remaining 
charges against him.528 Jordan appealed, arguing that the trial court committed plain error 
because his personal consent was required for dismissal of the assault.529 The court of appeals 
affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the dismissal rule only applied to dismissals 
without prejudice because the rule was based on the federal rule, which was intended to address 
dismissals without prejudice.530 The court of appeals thus held, affirming the trial court’s 
decision, that a defendant’s personal consent is not required for the State to dismiss a charge with 
prejudice after trial has begun in a criminal case.531 
 
Mayuyo v. State 
In Mayuyo v. State,532 the court of appeals held that a witness may not alter a defendant’s out-of-
court statement in order to avoid a constitutional confrontation clause problem if doing so would 
materially misrepresent what the witness understood the defendant to be saying.533 Mayuyo and 
his co-defendant, Balallo, were charged with sexually assaulting a woman.534 At trial, 
prosecutors sought to introduce an out-of-court statement that Mayuyo had made to his 
roommate shortly after the alleged sexual assault.535 When called upon to testify, the roommate 
would say that Mayuyo had stated several times, “we’re going to jail.”536 But the roommate 
understood Mayuyo to be saying that Mayuyo and Balallo were going to jail for what Balallo had 
done.537 In other words, according to the roommate’s understanding, Mayuyo was not 
incriminating himself, only Balallo.538 In order to avoid a Sixth Amendment confrontation clause 
problem, the trial court, over objections from the defense, allowed the prosecutor to instruct the 
roommate to testify that Mayuyo had said “I’m going to jail.”539 At trial and on appeal, Mayuyo 
argued that the alteration would materially change the meaning of the statement, as understood 
by both Mayuyo and the witness-roommate, because it would appear to be an admission of 
Mayuyo’s own wrongdoing rather than an assertion that Mayuyo was going to jail because of 
what Balallo had done.540 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the lower court, reasoning that 
although the alteration of Mayuyo’s statement protected Balallo’s confrontation rights and that 
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courts may alter a defendant’s out-of-court statements to preserve confrontation rights, this 
alteration was unfair to Mayuyo because it made it appear that Mayuyo was incriminating 
himself to a significantly greater degree than he actually was.541 The court found that the superior 
court failed to ensure that the altered version of Mayuyo’s statement still accurately reflected 
what Mayuyo said about his own culpability.542 The court reasoned that the altered statement 
materially misrepresented what Mayuyo said about his own involvement in the crime, and 
therefore should never have been introduced as evidence.543 Reversing the lower court’s 
decision, the court of appeals held that allowing the State to introduce an altered version of a 
defendant’s out-of-court statement that materially misrepresents what the defendant actually said 
is improper.544  
 
Nelson v. State 
In Nelson v. State,545 the court of appeals held that the superior court does not abuse its discretion 
in denying a request for the immediate appointment of conflict counsel when no specific 
assertions of incompetent representation had been provided.546 Nelson pled guilty to attempted 
first-degree sexual abuse of a minor as part of a plea agreement with the State.547 After his 
conviction, but before sentencing, Nelson claimed ineffective counsel from the public defender 
and sought to withdraw his plea, requesting a delay in sentencing and the appointment of a 
conflict counsel to litigate his claim of ineffective representation.548 On appeal, Nelson argued 
for a bright-line rule requiring trial judges to automatically appoint conflict counsel when an 
issue of ineffective representation is raised.549 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s 
decision, stating that Nelson had failed to provide any support for his claim of incompetent 
representation.550 Additionally, the court noted that most jurisdictions ultimately leave the issue 
of appointing conflict counsel to the discretion of the trial court.551 Affirming the trial court’s 
decision under the totality of the circumstances, the court of appeals held that the superior court 
does not abuse its discretion in denying a request for the immediate appointment of conflict 
counsel when no specific assertions of incompetent representation had been provided.552 
 
Nicklie v. State 
In Nicklie v. State,553 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that a jury's two guilty verdicts, given for 
the same offense, were required to merge into a single conviction and sentence under Alaska 
double jeopardy law.554  A jury found the defendant guilty of both third- and fourth-degree 
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assault for beating up and strangling his girlfriend.555 At sentencing, both the prosecutor and 
defense attorney agreed that the jury's verdicts should merge into a single conviction for the 
more serious crime, third-degree assault.556  The judge agreed with the parties, and imposed a 
sentence for third-degree assault.557  However, the judgment form declares that the defendant 
was “convicted” of both counts of assault and that the two counts were merged only “for 
sentencing purposes.”558  On appeal, the court held that Alaska law does not recognize the 
existence of merging “for sentencing purposes only.”559  The court asked the Alaska Court 
System to modify the sentencing report form that the lower court used, so as to avoid future 
confusion.560  It then remanded the case to clarify the judgment that the jury verdicts on third- 
and fourth-degree assault should merge into a single conviction for third-degree assault.561 Thus, 
a jury's two guilty verdicts for the same offense were required to merge into a single conviction 
and sentence under Alaska double jeopardy law.562 
 
Parson v. State 
In Parson v. State,563 the court of appeals held that the sentencing judge was not clearly mistaken 
in denying a request for a suspended imposition of a sentence because the judge found that the 
defendant’s conduct was more severe than common domestic violence assault.564  After leaving 
home for a week unannounced, Parson returned home to his family in an agitated state and 
physically assaulted his wife in front of their son by shoving her into the stone fireplace.565  
Parson disabled the family vehicles so that his wife and kids were unable to flee, and had a 
history of unreported domestic violence.566  After being convicted, Parson unsuccessfully 
requested a suspended imposition of a sentence, and subsequently appealed the denial.  The 
sentencing court has the sole discretion to suspend imposition of a sentence.567  The sentencing 
judge provided reasons for the denial, noting that Parson’s conduct was more severe than the 
average domestic assault.568  Affirming the sentencing judge’s decision, the court of appeals 
concluded that it was not clearly wrong for the judge to deny the suspended imposition of a 
sentence request.569  
 
Pieniazek v. State 
In Pieniazek v. State,570 the court of appeals held that the superior court misapplied the factors 
for determining a criminal defendant’s competency to stand trial, did not adequately investigate 
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the defendant’s current competency, and failed to adequately consider additional factors for 
determining competency.571 Pieniazek was charged with two counts of third-degree assault after 
he shot a gun at two state troopers responding to a disturbance on his property.572 His attorney 
moved for a judicial determination of his competency, and one of the two psychologists who 
evaluated him found him incompetent to stand trial.573 The trial judge found him competent to 
stand trial after conducting a hearing where witnesses testified as to his poor mental condition, 
finding that he had previously exhibited signs of competency.574 On appeal, Pieniazek argued 
that the court erred in determining his competency to stand trial because it did not appropriately 
apply the factors required under Alaska law and did not conduct an independent assessment of 
his present competency.575 The court of appeals found that the superior court applied only the 
competency factors for determining whether an individual has the intellectual functioning 
necessary to cope with ordinary demands in life, and that the superior court evaluated only 
Pieniazek’s past rather than current ability to cope.576 The court also held that additional factors 
for determining if an individual can understand the proceedings against him or is unable to assist 
in his defense under were not considered.577 Therefore, the court of appeals remanded the case 
for reconsideration of the defendant’s competency on the current record because the superior 
court misapplied the factors for determining an individual’s ability to cope, failed to investigate 
the defendant’s current competency, and failed to consider additional factors for determining 
competency.578 
 
Shepersky v. State of Alaska 
In Shepersky v. State of Alaska,579 the court of appeals held that a victim’s desires are not a 
sufficient reason to deny a request for bail; instead, denials of bail must be explained and based 
on doubt that the defendant will appear for his or her hearing, or on doubt that the community or 
victim will be safe.580 Shepersky was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment after pleading guilty 
to negligent homicide.581 The superior court denied Shepersky’s request for bail pending appeal, 
expressing doubt that the bail conditions would ensure the community’s safety but providing no 
further explanation.582 The superior court discussed its reliance on the victim’s strong opposition 
to bail and decided to respect the victim’s desires.583 Although some discretion is allowed in the 
denial of bail, the court of appeals held that the superior court must make “a reasoned decision” 
in denying bail; the victim’s desires for finality are not a sufficient reason to deny bail.584 The 
court of appeals vacated the decision and remanded the case to the superior court, requiring the 
court to consider only the safety of the community and victim, and the assurance that the 
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defendant will appear for his hearing; the superior court must also elaborate on any 
determination.585  
 
State v. Nicori 
In State v. Nicori,586 the court of appeals held that parties can seek reconsideration of a rehearing 
or reconsideration decision as long as the second reconsideration request relates to new problems 
resulting from the court’s prior reconsideration decision.587 Nicori filed a request for discovery 
and was re-indicted the following day on more serious charges.588 He then filed a motion 
alleging the appearance of prosecutorial vindictiveness and the superior court granted an 
evidentiary hearing.589 Nicori then subpoenaed the prosecuting attorney and the State asked the 
court to reconsider its decision.590 The superior court then reversed itself saying that the facts did 
not give rise to an appearance of prosecutorial vindictiveness, but that Nicori could still 
subpoena the prosecutor to ask him about actual vindictiveness.591 The State filed a second 
motion for reconsideration and the superior court held that it was barred from doing so.592 The 
court of appeals reversed the lower court’s refusal to allow the State to seek reconsideration.593 
While no Alaska case directly addressed this issue, the court recognized that many other states 
allow it and that allowing it furthers the policy of giving trial courts a full opportunity to review 
and correct errors before appeal.594 The court of appeals held that parties have the right to seek 
reconsideration of a decision issued by a trial court on reconsideration, so long as it involves a 
newly arisen problem.595 
 
State v. Seigle 
In State v. Seigle,596 the Court of Appeals of Alaska held that though judicial orders to lower 
courts in a specific case go into effect at the time dictated by appellate rules 507(b) and 512(a), 
the opinion becomes binding precedent as soon as it is issued until superseded by the supreme 
court.597 Seigle was convicted for sexual assault and sentenced below the normal minimum by a 
special panel which relied on the holding of Collins v. State.598 Collins was awaiting a hearing by 
the Alaska Supreme Court, and the supreme court ultimately dismissed it when new legislation 
overturned the court of appeals holding in Collins.599 The prosecution appealed Seigle’s sentence 
arguing that because Collins was on appeal and then overturned, appellate rules 507(b) and 
512(a) meant its judgment never became binding precedent.600 The prosecution contended this 
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made the sentencing commission’s reliance on Collins illegal.601 The court of appeals explained 
that Appellate Rule’s 507(b) and 512(a) govern when the court of appeal’s orders to a lower 
court take effect in a particular case.602 It distinguished this from when the court’s opinion on the 
law becomes binding precedent.603 The court of appeals indicated that the legislative history and 
plain text of the appellate rules support this conclusion.604 Affirming the sentencing panel’s 
decision, the court of appeals held that though judicial orders to lower courts in a specific case go 
into effect at the time dictated by appellate rules 507(b) and 512(a), the opinion becomes binding 
precedent as soon as it is issued until superseded by the supreme court.605 
 
Stiner v. State 
In Stiner v. State,606 the court of appeals held that it is does not violate double jeopardy to convict 
a defendant of both being a felon in possession of a concealable firearm and for violating the 
terms of release by possessing a firearm.607 While on bail release pending the appeal of his 
conviction for felony assault, Stiner was stopped in his truck for a traffic infraction.608 The 
officer who conducted the stop observed a pistol barrel in the vehicle and Stiner was later 
convicted of three offenses relating to the possession of a firearm: felon in possession of a 
concealable firearm, and two counts of violating the conditions of his release (that he obey all 
laws, and that he not possess a firearm).609 At sentencing, Stiner’s attorney asked the superior 
court to merge the convictions for all three offenses.610 The superior court ruled that Stiner’s two 
convictions for violating the terms of his release should be merged, but that the conviction for 
violating terms of release should not merge with the felon-in-possession conviction.611 On 
appeal, Stiner argued that the failure to merge the convictions constituted double jeopardy.612 
The court of appeals, however, explained that separate convictions for the same conduct are 
permitted under double jeopardy doctrine when the statutory interests for each offense are 
sufficiently distinct to support separate convictions.613 Here, the court of appeals agreed with the 
superior court that Stiner’s violation of his bail conditions implicated a societal interest that is 
substantially different from the societal interest in prohibiting felons from possessing 
concealable firearms.614 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that it is does not 
violate double jeopardy to convict a defendant of both being a felon in possession of a 
concealable firearm and for violating the terms of release by possessing a firearm. 615  
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Wahl v. State 
In Wahl v. State,616 the court of appeals held that in order to introduce grand jury testimony when 
a declarant-witness is unavailable, the proponent must show that there was a similar motive in 
both examinations.617 Wahl was convicted of murder.618 At his trial, he contested the charge on 
the theory that someone else had committed the murder.619 One possibility, he argued, was 
Hardwick.620 Hardwick had testified before the grand jury.621 At Wahl’s jury trial, the prosecutor 
had intended to call Hardwick as a witness, but then announced that they could not locate him.622 
It turned out that he, without notice, had left Alaska.623 Wahl moved to introduce Hardwick’s 
grand jury testimony under the prior testimony exception to the rule against hearsay.624 After a 
hearing, the trial court denied Wahl’s motion.625 The court of appeals, noting that there had been 
no cases in Alaska deciding how the prior testimony exception to the rule against hearsay applied 
to grand jury testimony, agreed with the trial court.626 Drawing from the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the related federal evidentiary rule, the court of appeals noted that in order to 
introduce hearsay that is sworn testimony, the examiner must have a similar motive in 
questioning the witness.627 Thus, the court reasoned that Hardwick’s grand jury testimony was 
not admissible because the prosecutor’s motive examining Hardwick before the grand jury, to 
elicit facts about Wahl’s behavior in the days surrounding the murder, would not be the same 
that Wahl would have in introducing the testimony at trial, to suggest that Hardwick was the 
murderer.628 The court of appeals added that because the similar motive was lacking, the 
testimony was also inadmissible under the residual exception to the rule against hearsay because 
it thus lacked sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.629 The court of appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s exclusion of the grand jury testimony, holding that a party seeking to introduce grand 
jury testimony when the declarant-witness is unavailable must show that the examiner at trial 
would have a similar motive to that of the grand jury examiner.630  
 
Willock v. State 
In Willock v. State,631 the court of appeals held that evidence of a person’s previous acts is not 
admissible at trial under Alaska R. Evid. 404(a) if that evidence is solely being used to prove a 
person’s general proclivity to engage in that conduct when that evidence is not otherwise 
relevant to an issue in dispute.632 In the case at issue, the State asked the superior court to 
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introduce evidence of defendant Willock’s prior sexual assault.633 The superior court ruled that 
evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction was admissible given both the strong similarities 
between the present case and Willock’s previous conviction, and that the evidence was used for a 
non-character purpose in displaying the defendant’s intent and plan to commit sexual assault.634 
The court of appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Evidence Rule 404(a) 
requires that a judge applies the words “‘intent’, ‘plan’, ‘knowledge’, or ‘absence of mistake or 
accident’” in their technical sense in order to determine whether the evidence actually has a case 
specific purpose other than illustrating the defendant’s general character.635 The court explained 
that the defendant’s intent would not be at issue given Willock’s argument that he did not engage 
in sexual conduct at all.636 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that 
evidence of a person’s previous acts is not admissible at trial if that evidence is being used to 
make an inference that his past actions illustrate a general desire to engage in that conduct 
again.637 
 
Wyatt v. State 
In Wyatt v. State,638 the court of appeals held that a petitioner’s application for post-conviction 
relief need only set forth a prima facie case for relief to survive the pleadings stage.639 Toward 
the end of Wyatt’s criminal trial for murder and evidence tampering, his attorney announced that 
he intended to rest his case without putting Wyatt on the stand.640 Wyatt was convicted of both 
charges, and filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief raising a number of claims, 
including the assertion that Wyatt’s trial attorney had actively obstructed Wyatt’s decision to 
testify on his own behalf.641 The superior court appointed an attorney to represent Wyatt, and 
that attorney filed an amended application for post-conviction relief that did not include Wyatt’s 
claim that his trial attorney had obstructed him from testifying.642 The superior court dismissed 
Wyatt’s post-conviction relief application, finding that it failed to state a prima facie case.643 
Wyatt then filed a second application for post-conviction relief, alleging that the attorney who 
represented him in the first post-conviction relief litigation was incompetent because he 
abandoned Wyatt’s original claim for relief—that Wyatt’s trial attorney had actively obstructed 
him from testifying.644 Wyatt submitted a detailed affidavit in support of his claim, but the 
superior court dismissed Wyatt’s second application for post-conviction relief.645 The court of 
appeals reversed, arguing that Wyatt’s burden to avoid dismissal was only to offer a prima facie 
case for post-conviction relief. 646 The court reasoned that because Wyatt did not have to prove at 
this stage he was actually entitled to relief, it did not matter that there might be a possibility that 
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his attorney had acted competently.647 Because the affidavit established a prima facie case that 
his post-conviction attorney incompetently selected the issues to be pursued in the amended 
application, the court of appeals reasoned that Wyatt’s second post-conviction relief application 
met the standard to avoid dismissal.648 Reversing the superior court, the court of appeals held 
that a petitioner’s application for post-conviction relief should not be dismissed when it sets forth 
a prima facie case for relief.649  
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EMPLOYMENT LAW 
 
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Darrow 
In Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Darrow,650 the Alaska Supreme Court held [1] that the offset for social 
security disability (SSDI) benefits against permanent total disability (PTD) compensation 
payments was not limited to claimant's actual wage at time of injury; and [2] the statute that 
allowed reduction to PTD benefits did not authorize any offset for previously paid permanent 
partial impairment (PPI) benefits.651 In this worker’s compensation case, the Alaska Supreme 
Court reviewed the proper method for calculating the PTD compensation of an injured 
employee.652 An employee incurred a job-related knee injury, yet continued working for ten 
years until she became permanently and totally disabled due to that injury.653 Her employer 
asked the Alaska Compensation Board and Worker’s Compensation Appeals Commission 
(“Commission”) to offset the employees PTD compensation by her SSDI benefits payments and 
earlier PPI payments accrued during the ten years in which she continued working after 
sustaining the injury.654 In the first part of the opinion, the supreme court construed two Alaskan 
statutes to determine the proper calculation for an offset of SSDI payments.655 The Commission 
had previously rejected the employer’s proposal for an offset amount, siding with the 
employee.656 Using the text of the statutes, legislative history and plain reason, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the Commission correctly calculated offsets based on the employees’ 
average weekly wage and that they applied the offset correctly.657  In the second part of the 
opinion, the Court determined that the Commission incorrectly allowed an offset for PPI.658 This 
was based on the plain words of the statute, which allowed offsets for permanent partial 
disability benefits, but not for PPI.659  Thus, the court affirmed the part of the Commission's 
decision regarding the calculation of the SSDI offset and reversed the part of the Commission's 
decision permitting an offset for PPI benefits.660  Offsets for SSDI benefits against PTD 
compensation payments are not limited to claimant's actual wage at time of injury and the statute 
that allows reduction to PTD benefits do not authorize any offset for PPI benefits.661 
 
State v. Shea 
In State v. Shea,662 the supreme court held that the administrative law judge’s decision to deny an 
employee occupational disability benefits because prolonged sitting during employment was not 
a proximate cause of the employee’s disability was supported by substantial evidence.663 Shea 
presented evidence that she suffered from chronic pain in the form of ilioinginal neuralgia and 
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that the sitting requirement of her employment was a substantial factor, and therefore a 
proximate cause, of her permanent disability.664 The evidentiary record contained conflicting 
medical evidence regarding the status, extent, and aggravating circumstances of her pain.665 On 
appeal, the superior court reversed the ALJ’s decision, finding a logical inconsistency with the 
ALJ’s determination that Shea’s employment-related sitting was a but-for but not a proximate 
cause of her disability. The supreme court reversed the superior court’s finding, affirming the 
administrative law judge’s decision, because Shea failed to carry the burden of proving her 
employment was a substantial factor in causing her disability.666 The court weighed five factors 
in reaching its conclusion: (1) conflicting medical testimony concerning the on-going versus 
resolved nature of her ilioinginal neuralgia; (2) Shea’s failure to list employment sitting as a pain 
trigger until after filing her occupational disability claim; (3) medical testimony that ordinary 
daily activities other than sitting aggravated Shea’s pain; (4) Shea’s medical expert’s testimony 
that sitting aggravated her chronic pain 5% to 10%; and (5) medical testimony that psychological 
factors may have contributed to the chronic pain.667 The court reasoned that, considering the five 
factors, sufficient evidence existed for the ALJ to determine that reasonable persons would not 
regard sitting at work as an important enough cause of Shea’s pain to attached legal 
responsibility to it.668 The dissent agreed with the superior court regarding the logical 
inconsistency in finding employment-related sitting was a but-for but not a proximate cause of 
Shea’s disability669 and argued that the substantial factor determination was met by the medical 
evidence despite the contradictory testimony.670 Reversing the superior court’s decision, and 
affirming the administrative law judge’s decision, the supreme court held that the administrative 
law judge’s decision to deny an employee occupational disability benefits because prolonged 
sitting during employment was not a proximate cause of the employee’s disability was supported 
by substantial evidence.671 
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ETHICS & PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
In re District Court Judge 
In In re District Court Judge,672 the supreme court held that a judge does not have a duty to 
correct erroneous statements of independent supporters during an election.673 After the Alaska 
Commission on Judicial Conduct recommended that a judge not be retained after a disciplinary 
action, the judge decided not to campaign in the next election.674 A friend mounted a retention 
campaign on the judge’s behalf, without his knowledge or consent.675 The Commission found 
that this campaign promulgated misleading statements in its campaign materials, and issued an 
informal private admonishment on the judge for not publicly correcting the statements.676 The 
judge filed an application for relief with the supreme court, which the court granted.677 The court 
first found it had constitutional authority to review informal private admonishments of members 
of the judiciary, and that review here was appropriate because the judge raised an unsettled issue 
of Alaska law.678 The court then held that a judge does not have a duty to correct statements 
made by independent supporters. 679 The court reasoned that a judge has a duty in an election to 
not knowingly make misrepresentations, and she is forbidden from authorizing or permitting 
someone else from taking an action she as a candidate cannot take.680 The court found that the 
judge could not have knowingly misrepresented facts, as he was unaware that the materials even 
existed.681 The court further reasoned that because the judge had no control over the publication 
of the materials, and because the materials clearly stated that they were not authorized by the 
candidate, the judge did not have a duty to publicly address their misrepresentations.682 The 
supreme court reversed the Commission’s informal private admonishment, finding that a judge 
in a retention election has no duty to publicly correct statements made by independent 
supporters.683 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
672 392 P.3d 480 (Alaska 2017). 
673 Id. at 482. 
674 Id. 
675 Id. 
676 Id. at 483. 
677 Id. 
678 Id. at 484. 
679 Id. 
680 Id. at 485. 
681 Id. at 487 
682 Id. 
683 Id. 
50 
 
FAMILY LAW 
 
Alex H. v. State Dept. of Health & Social Services 
In Alex H. v. State Dept. of Health & Social Services,684 the supreme court held that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by denying a father's statutory request for transportation to 
attend in person his termination of parental rights trial.685 Alex and his wife were married and the 
biological parents of three children.686 In 2014, Alex was arrested and indicted for 27 counts of 
first degree sexual abuse of a minor and the Office of Children’s Services petitioned to terminate 
both parents’ parental rights.687 One week before the scheduled termination trial, Alex sought an 
order requiring Alaska Department of Public Safety (DPS) to transport him from the jail to the 
courthouse so that he could attend the termination trial in person.688 DPS filed a written 
opposition contending that Alex's in-person attendance at the termination trial would add little 
value because he did not intend to testify and that DPS would face significant burdens in 
accommodating the request.689 The superior court denied Alex’s order and conducted the trial 
without the parties, ultimately terminating both Alex’s and his wife’s parental rights in January 
of 2016.690 Alex appealed the termination order, claiming the superior court abused its discretion 
by denying his transportation request.691 The supreme court found that the trial court properly 
considered all the factors presented, weighed them, and used its significant discretion to deny the 
transport.692 The supreme court also concluded that the decision by the trial court was not 
manifestly unreasonable.693 Thus, the supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by denying a father's statutory request for transportation to attend in person his 
termination of parental rights trial.694 
 
Bruce H. v. Jennifer L. 
In Bruce H. v. Jennifer L.,695 the supreme court held that a finding of domestic violence need not 
be supported by separate judicial proceedings nor multiple incidents of domestic violence for the 
purposes of finding a substantial change in circumstances when a court decides a legal custody 
modification motion or makes a best interests determination.696 Bruce and Jennifer divorced in 
2012 and agreed that Jennifer would have primary physical custody and sole legal custody of 
their only son.697 In 2016, Bruce requested a modification to their custody arrangement so that 
they would have joint legal custody and shared physical custody.698 Soon after, Jennifer sought 
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the court’s authorization for her and the child to move to Kentucky.699 In arguing for custody 
modification and against authorization for Jennifer moving to Kentucky with their child, Bruce 
alleged that Jennifer had committed domestic violence against her ex-boyfriend.700 Testimony by 
Jennifer’s ex-boyfriend and Jennifer supported Bruce’s allegation.701 Nevertheless, the lower 
court denied Bruce’s motion to modify custody, finding that there had been no substantial 
change in circumstances, and authorized Jennifer to move with the child to Kentucky, finding 
that the relocation was in the child’s best interests.702 Bruce appealed both of the court’s 
decisions.703 Vacating and remanding the lower court’s decisions, the supreme court held that the 
lower court committed legal error in requiring that a finding of domestic violence be supported 
by a separate judicial proceeding or multiple incidents of domestic violence.704 The court 
reasoned that the lower court improperly relied on section 25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes in 
requiring that a finding of domestic violence be supported by a separate judicial proceeding or 
multiple incidents of domestic violence.705 Vacating and remanding the lower court’s decisions, 
the supreme court held that a finding of domestic violence need not be supported by separate 
judicial proceedings nor multiple incidents of domestic violence for the purposes of finding a 
substantial change in circumstances on a motion to modify legal custody or in making a best 
interests determination.706 
 
Barry H. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Barry H. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,707 the supreme court held that trial 
courts, in determining whether to allow self-representation in a Child in Need of Aid (CINA) 
proceeding, must apply the standard developed under McCracken v. State.708 The Office of 
Children’s Services (OCS) took emergency custody of Barry’s children after receiving reports of 
familial abuse.709 OCS then sought to terminate Barry’s parental rights to children in a CINA 
proceeding.710 During the proceeding, Barry requested to represent himself.711 Basing its 
decision on Barry’s erratic behavior and eccentric statements, the trial court denied Barry’s 
request for self-representation.712 On appeal, Barry argued that parents in CINA proceedings 
have a constitutional right to represent themselves.713 The supreme court reasoned that CINA’s 
rule, providing that a court “shall accept a valid waiver of the right to counsel by any party if the 
court determines that the party understands the benefits of counsel and knowingly waives those 
benefits,” effectively incorporated the McCracken standard.714 The McCracken standard requires 
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parties to “present[ ] themselves in a way that is rational and coherent.”715 The supreme court 
affirmed the trial court, finding that it did not abuse its discretion in denying Barry’s request to 
represent himself in CINA proceedings because the McCracken standard applies in CINA 
proceedings.716  
 
Caitlyn E. v. State of Alaska, Dep’t of Health & Social Services 
In Caitlyn E. v. State of Alaska, Dep’t of Health & Social Services,717 the supreme court held that 
under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), an individual without expertise in substance abuse 
could still testify as an expert in a child custody proceeding involving substance abuse, if the 
individual had the requisite expertise in Indian child-rearing and child protection.718 The Office 
of Children’s Services (OCS) took emergency custody of Caitlyn E.’s children in January of 
2013 due to Caitlyn E.’s involvement with drugs.719 After protracted proceedings, a termination 
of parental rights trial was held in superior court in 2016.720 OCS called a woman from the same 
Alaska Native tribe as Caitlyn E. who had six years of doing social services work for the tribe as 
its ICWA expert;721 the specific knowledge of tribe culture was required by the 2015 Bureau of 
Indian Affairs Guidelines.722 Over Caitlyn E’s objection, she was qualified as an expert in the 
tribe’s child-rearing practices and child protection.723 The witness did not have an expertise in 
substance abuse or a formal professional education, nor was she a licensed social worker.724 
Caitlyn E. appealed the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the trial court had abused 
its discretion insofar as it allowed the witness, a qualified expert on child-rearing, to testify about 
substance abuse.725 The supreme court disagreed, reasoning that the witness had not testified on 
Caitlyn E.’s substance abuse, but rather was restricted to whether substance abuse has an effect 
on child rearing and child protection, which was critical for determining actual neglect or abuse 
in this case.726 Thus, the supreme court held that an ICWA expert witness could opine on how 
issues outside her expertise—to wit, substance abuse—affected matters within her expertise, 
child-rearing.727 
 
Dara v. Gish 
In Dara v. Gish,728 the supreme court held the superior court did not err in awarding the maternal 
grandmother and step-grandfather joint legal and primary physical custody of their grandchild.729  
The grandparents of a child with developmental delays and dyslexia who had been his legal 
guardians for much of his young life filed for custody of the grandchild after the child’s mother 
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brought an action to terminate their guardianship.730 The superior court found that the 
grandparents had achieved psychological parent status with their grandchild, a more demanding 
means of establishing standing than that required for third parties to seek custody.731 The 
superior court held that the grandparents had proven by clear and convincing evidence that their 
grandchild would suffer clear detriment if his mother were given sole custody, specifically given 
the boy’s special educational, emotional, and psychological needs.732 On appeal, the mother 
challenged many of the superior court’s factual findings, including that she has an unstable 
home, is unwilling to recognize her son’s special needs, and is ill-equipped to meet those 
needs.733 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the lower court 
applied the correct legal framework and its findings were not clearly erroneous given that the 
mother had failed to enroll the child in therapy during a summer visit when her visitation rights 
were conditioned on her doing so.734 The court further reasoned that the superior court could 
have found the mother has an unstable home with her husband, who she married after knowing 
for only 30 days, because he has 5 children with 3 different women yet has visitation with none, 
and he exhibited explosive anger during an outburst in an earlier court proceeding.735 Affirming 
the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held the superior court did not err in awarding 
the maternal grandmother and step-grandfather joint legal and primary physical custody of their 
grandchild.736 
 
Dennis O. v. Stephanie O. 
In Dennis O. v. Stephanie O.,737 the supreme court held that the Alaska Constitution’s due 
process clause does not require an indigent parent be provided counsel in a custody hearing when 
the other parent is represented by private counsel unless lack of counsel would effectively deny 
the indigent parent the right to argue the case.738 Dennis and Stephanie were divorced in 2011 
and awarded joint legal custody of their four children; they shared physical custody of the 
younger three, and Stephanie was awarded primary physical custody of their eldest.739 In January 
2014 Stephanie moved to take sole legal custody and primary physical custody of all four 
children because Dennis allegedly sexually assaulted her and trespassed in her home in 2013.740 
Stephanie retained counsel for the custody proceeding and Dennis moved for the state to provide 
him counsel based on his indigent status in the interests of due process.741 Dennis’s request was 
denied and despite significant help in his self-representation, he lost and Stephanie obtained 
custody.742 On appeal, Dennis argued that denying him state appointed counsel violates Alaska’s 
due process clause and equal protection clauses.743 The supreme court adopted the Mathews v. 
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Eldridge balancing test which considers the likelihood of an erroneous decision, the strength of 
the government interest, and the magnitude of the private interest to determine what due process 
is required.744 It explained indigent parents in custody suits as a class are typically not provided 
counsel because there is a low risk of erroneous deprivation, the government has substantial 
interests in cheap and efficient proceedings, and parental interests in loss of custody are less 
severe than in cases which threaten termination of parental rights.745 The supreme court 
elaborated that the same balancing should be applied to each individual case, and that here no 
facts made it practically impossible for Dennis to adequately represent himself so fairness did not 
require he be provided counsel.746 The supreme court affirmed the lower court holding that the 
Alaska Constitution’s due process clause does not require an indigent parent be provided counsel 
in a custody hearing when the other parent is represented by private counsel unless lack of 
counsel would effectively deny the parent the right to argue the case.747 
 
Easley v. Easley 
In Easley v. Easley748, the supreme court affirmed the lower court’s order that a spouse who has 
received notice of and been given numerous opportunities to be heard regarding the enforcement 
of a settlement agreement previous to a judgment does not have his or her due process rights 
violated.749 Kevin Easley and Tammy Easley filed for divorce in 2007.750 Paragraph 21(b) of their 
2008 divorce decree, which was based on a settlement agreement, required Kevin to pay Tammy 
$325,000 after selling the marital home.751 Paragraph 22 of the decree required Kevin to pay 
Tammy $3,500 in spousal support each month until the sale.752 As early as 2009, Kevin realized 
that the marital home had substantially declined in value and he filed an Alaska Civil Rule 60(b) 
motion for relief from judgment asserting mutual mistake of fact regarding valuation of the 
home.753 In 2015, the issue was revisited sua sponte, and the judge ordered Kevin to sell the home 
within 90 days.754 Kevin appealed, arguing he was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard 
regarding the sale of the marital home and the interpretation of the decree, and therefore was 
prejudiced by a lack of due process.755 The supreme court affirmed the superior court, reasoning 
that there was adequate notice and Kevin had an opportunity to be heard based on the previous 
arguments raised by Kevin and hearings regarding the sale of the house.756 The court further 
reasoned that there is adequate notice when an aggrieved party has an opportunity to present at a 
case and have its merits fairly judged.757 Affirming the superior court’s decision, the supreme court 
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held that a spouse, who has had numerous opportunities to be heard regarding the enforcement of 
a settlement agreement prior to a judgment, does not have his or her due process rights violated.758 
 
Fredrickson v. Hackett 
In Fredrickson v. Hackett,759 the supreme court held that in a motion to modify custody, 
obtaining suitable housing for the children constitutes a significant change in circumstances and 
warrants an evidentiary hearing.760 Under their divorce agreement, Frederick received a cabin 
that was rented to a tenant at the time, and Hackett received the family home.761 More than three 
years after the divorce decree was issued, Frederickson filed a motion to modify custody, seeking 
approximately forty percent physical custody instead of twenty-five percent.762 In his motion and 
affidavit, he stated that the agreement initially left him without suitable housing for the 
children.763 Since then, however, the tenant had moved out of the cabin, Frederickson had moved 
in, and he had built an addition so that the cabin had large kitchen/living area and separate 
bedrooms for each child.764 Without holding a hearing, the superior court denied Frederickson’s 
motion to modify custody, explaining that Frederickson’s remodeling of the cabin constituted 
merely an improvement and was insufficient to establish a change in circumstances.765 The 
supreme court reversed the superior court’s order, reasoning that Frederickson’s claims about his 
change in living situation were sufficient to require a hearing.766 The court reasoned that 
Frederickson’s circumstance, his ability to provide living conditions suitable for children, 
substantially changed when the tenant left and he moved into the cabin and enlarged it.767 The 
court noted that the custody section of the agreement provided Hackett with primary custody 
while the property section left Frederickson without suitable accommodations for the children, 
therefore this alleged change in his living situation was substantial.768 Furthermore, the court 
added that the change in living situation was not temporary and was directly related to his ability 
to house the children.769 Thus, the supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that a change 
in living condition that provides suitable housing for children is a substantial change in 
circumstances and is therefore sufficient to require a hearing.770 
 
Grove v. Grove 
In Grove v. Grove,771 the supreme court upheld the presumption that student loan debt is marital 
debt772 and held that a spouse’s TRICARE, post-retirement medical benefits are marital property 
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requiring objective valuation.773 Cheryl brought a divorce action against Melvin, and following a 
bench trial, the judge granted a divorce and divided the estate.774 At trial, the parties testified to 
Cheryl’s student loan debt and presented expert testimony to evaluate Melvin’s post-retirement 
medical benefits.775 In dividing the estate, the court characterized most of Cheryl’s student loan 
debt as marital and all of Melvin’s benefits as marital, but the court declined to assign a cash 
value to Melvin’s benefits.776 On appeal, Melvin challenged the court’s characterization of 
Cheryl’s student loan debt, and both parties appealed the court’s method of valuation and 
allocation of Melvin’s medical benefits.777 The supreme court upheld the precedent in finding 
that student loan debt is marital debt.778 The supreme court held that Melvin’s medical benefits 
should be evaluated.779 The supreme court said the experts provided evaluations that comply 
with precedent because they estimated Melvin's TRICARE benefits' premium subsidy value by 
reference to analogous plans.780 Reversing and remanding the lower court’s decision, the 
supreme held that student loan debt is marital debt781 and held that a spouse’s TRICARE benefits 
are marital property requiring objective valuation.782   
 
Hockema v. Hockema 
In Hockema v. Hockema,783 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the lower court’s decision to 
award spousal support to a divorcing wife, instead of a larger share of the marital estate, was not 
supported by its findings.784 Throughout the proceedings, the divorcing wife showed the lower 
court a strong and consistent preference for receiving spousal support payments, instead of a 
greater share of her marital assets.785 The lower court awarded her spousal support payments 
partly on that basis.786 On review, the court found that the lower court abused its discretion by 
deferring to the wife’s preferences.787 The Supreme Court held that spousal support payments are 
ordinarily disfavored because the courts do not want to require one person to support another on 
a long-term basis.788 When possible, the courts should instead try to address spouses' financial 
needs through property distribution.789 Here, the lower court should have entered findings about 
whether the wife’s needs could be met through unequal property division or through a larger 
cash equalization payment.790 The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's spousal support 
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award and remanded the case for further consideration.791  Thus, the lower court’s decision to 
award spousal support to a divorcing wife, instead of a larger share of the marital estate, was not 
supported by its findings.792 
 
Horning v. Horning 
In Horning v. Horning,793 the supreme court held that, in a divorce proceeding, the trial court 
could not invade one spouse’s separate property by using that property to offset the value of the 
other spouse’s marital property.794 The wife was eligible for healthcare from the Indian Health 
Service (IHS) because she was an Alaska Native.795 The husband had unvested post-retirement 
healthcare benefits through the military’s TRICARE program.796 When the superior court 
divided the marital estate after the couple’s divorce trial, it did not classify, value, or distribute 
either party’s healthcare, finding instead that each had “an equal benefit that [was] in essence a 
wash for the purpose of dividing the marital estate.”797 On appeal, the supreme court disagreed, 
reasoning that a proper equitable division of marital assets involves first determining what 
property is available for distribution, then finding the value of the property, and finally, dividing 
the property equitably.798 Because the superior court did not provide those detailed findings in 
this case, the supreme court argued, this was reversible error and typically would require a 
remand to the trial court for additional findings.799 However, the supreme court further argued 
that, in this case, additional findings are unnecessary because the court can classify both parties’ 
health benefits as either marital or separate property as a matter of law based on the existing 
record.800 Because the wife’s IHS healthcare was separate property and the husband’s TRICARE 
benefits were marital property, the supreme court vacated the superior court’s order and 
remanded this case with instructions to classify the husband’s post-retirement TRICARE benefits 
as marital property and to classify the wife’s eligibility for IHS healthcare as separate property, 
and to equitably divide the marital property based on these findings.801 In vacating the superior 
court’s order and remanding for further proceedings, the supreme court held that the trial court 
could not invade one spouse’s separate property by using that property to offset the value of the 
other spouse’s marital property.802  
 
In re Adoption of Hannah L.  
In In re Adoption of Hannah L, 803 the supreme court held that an adoption petition can be denied 
based on either a lack of required consent or based on the best interests of the child.804 Tarrah 
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and Brandon are the biological parents of Hannah, and never married.805 Tarrah and Daniel 
married, and Brandon continued to attempt to repair his relationship with Hannah.806 Eventually, 
Daniel petitioned to adopt Hannah.807 The superior court denied Daniel’s adoption petition 
because it determined that (1) Brandon’s conduct did not terminate his parental rights and (2) it 
was in Hannah’s best interests to maintain a relationship with Brandon.808 On appeal, Daniel 
argued that Brandon had waived his consent and that the court erred by deciding the adoption 
was not in Hannah’s best interests.809 The supreme court rejected this argument, explaining that a 
court can only issue an adoption decree if both (1) the parent’s consent has been obtained or 
excused and (2) it is in the child’s best interests. 810 As a result, the court reasoned that a negative 
determination under either the consent or best interests prong will preserve parental rights.811  
Upholding the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that an adoption petition can be 
denied by either finding that the parent did not give proper consent to the adoption or if the court 
determines the adoption is not in the child’s best interests.812  
 
Jordan v. Watson 
In Jordan v. Watson,813 the supreme court affirmed a lower court’s denial of a motion by 
grandparents seeking visitation rights with their grandchild because the filings failed to allege 
any detriment to the child that would arise from failing to provide visitation rights.814  Cheryl and 
Thomas Jordan are the paternal grandparents to their young grandchild, but alleged that the 
child’s mother did not let them visit with the child for sufficient amounts of time and that she 
would not let them babysit the child.815  The Jordans sought visitation rights with their 
grandchild, but the superior court denied the motion without a hearing, so they appealed.816  
Alaska law allows grandparents to seek visitation rights with their grandchild.817  However, 
judicial precedent imposes a requirement that the grandparents prove that the lack of visitation is 
detrimental to the child.818  Here, the grandparents did not include anything in their filings to 
suggest that the child would suffer if the grandparents were not provided visitation.819  Therefore, 
the supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, because the grandparents’ motion 
failed to satisfy the minimal requirements for a meritorious claim.820 
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Judd v. Burns 
In Judd v. Burns,821 the supreme court held that a trial court abuses its discretion by modifying 
legal custody in a manner that was neither requested by either party, supported by evidence 
demonstrating the need for the modification, nor at issue to the parties.822 Judd and Burns 
divorced and were able to agree on a shared custody arrangement.823 In 2015, Burns, the mother, 
filed a motion to modify the custody agreement so that she could have primary physical custody 
of their son and move to Hawaii.824 Following a hearing, the court granted the requested 
modification as to the physical custody arrangement.825 However, the court also modified Judd 
and Burns’ legal custody arrangement, granting Burns final say on legal custody issues.826 Burns 
had not sought modification of legal custody, and therefore had presented no evidence at the 
hearing to support such a modification.827 To the contrary, she supported legal custody remaining 
as it was in her motion to the court.828 On appeal, Judd argued that the court had abused its 
discretion in making a modification that neither party had asked for or adduced evidence to.829 
The supreme court agreed with Judd that the change was more than a simple clarification, as 
Burns had contended, and gave Burns the ability to effect a change over Judd’s disagreement.830 
The court reasoned that because Burns did not seek to modify legal custody, she did not adduce 
evidence or allege facts, and Judd received no notice that legal custody could be at issue.831 
Vacating the lower court’s modification of legal custody, the supreme court held that it was an 
abuse of discretion to modify legal custody when neither party requested it, the allegations in 
support of the modification motion did not support it, and there was no notice that the court 
would consider it.832 
 
Jude M. v. State 
In Jude M. v. State,833 the supreme court held a parent’s parental “rights of custody” may be 
deemed “suspended” for the purposes of appointing a guardian for their unmarried, minor child, 
even though the parent still retains “residual rights” of custody.834 The Office of Children’s 
Services (“OCS”) petitioned to terminate M’s parental rights of custody over his minor daughter 
in August 2012 while he was completing a prison sentence for transporting child pornography 
across state lines and his daughter was in OCS’s custody.835 After twice denying termination, the 
superior court granted OCS’s alternative request that M’s daughter be placed in a long-term 
guardianship with her maternal aunt, rejecting M’s argument that the superior court lacked 
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authority to establish a guardianship.836 M contended that, because the superior court was only 
authorized to appoint a guardian for an unmarried minor if all parental “rights of custody”  had 
been terminated or suspended, the court lacked such authority in his case as he retained “residual 
rights” of parenting and thus his parental rights of custody had not all been terminated or 
suspended.837 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s authority to establish a 
guardianship, reasoning that the parent of a child in OCS custody retains residual rights, but 
rights of custody are not included in those residual rights.838 The court further reasoned that the 
appropriate question is whether M’s “custodial rights” were suspended while his daughter was in 
OCS’s custody.839  Because M was prevented from exercising his “parental rights of custody” 
once OCS took custody of his daughter, his parental “rights of custody” for purposes of the 
superior court’s authority to appoint a guardian were considered “suspended.”840 Affirming the 
superior court’s authority, the supreme court held a parent’s parental “rights of custody” may be 
deemed “suspended” for the purposes of appointing a guardian for their unmarried, minor child, 
even though the parent still retains “residual rights” of custody.841 
 
Kylie L. v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services 
In Kylie L. v. State,842 the supreme court held that it was error for the trial court to excuse OCS 
from making reasonable efforts to reunify a mother and daughter when an appropriate basis for 
exclusion was not determined by clear and convincing evidence.843 In the case at issue, the trial 
court found that Belinda suffered injuries on three separate occasions while in the care of her 
mother, Kylie L.844 After the third incident of reported harm, OCS took emergency custody of 
Belinda, placed her in foster care, and referred her to individual and dyadic therapy.845 The 
second therapist assigned believed that visitation between the mother and daughter was causing 
Belinda’s post-traumatic stress disorder to trigger, and effectively terminated visitation and 
dyadic therapy.846 However, in a Quality Assurance Report, OCS internally determined that the 
services it provided had “not been well organized and have not served to facilitate reunification,” 
and that they were not providing a positive visitation environment.847 On appeal, OCS argued 
that its failure to provide the reasonable efforts required by statute to reunite Kylie and Belinda 
could be excused by two different bases.848 OCS argued that the statute specifically applied since 
“the trial court ‘found Kylie subjected Belinda to circumstances that posed a substantial risk to 
her health or safety” given the three prior incidents of abuse.849 The supreme court declined to 
affirm on the basis of the statute considering the trial court did not base its decision on that 
ground, but rather on Dr. Cranor’s testimony that the bond between Kylie and Belinda had been 
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“irrevocably damaged.”850 The supreme court found that OCS was not excused from making 
reasonable efforts to reunify a mother and daughter when the trial court did not find by clear and 
convincing evidence grounds for excusal based specifically on the bases provided in the 
statute.851 
 
Matthew H. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Matthew H. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,852 the supreme court held that a 
parent’s parental rights can be terminated when the parent’s significant unresolved mental health 
issues are the root cause of the child’s harm, even if the parent makes efforts to resolve the 
physical conditions of his home.853 In May 2013, the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) 
removed Matthew H.’s 7 and 13-year-old daughters from his home after finding that the one-
room cabin they shared had unclean living conditions, lacked electricity, plumbing, and water.854 
The children were injured, severely underweight, occasionally had to forage for food at waste 
transfer sites, and tested positive for methamphetamine.855 Matthew H. was diagnosed with 
several mental disorders and substance abuse, yet he did not engage in substance abuse treatment 
or mental health counseling despite recommendations that he do so.856 The superior court granted 
OCS’ petition to terminate Matthew H.’s parental rights, finding that the daughters were children 
in need of aid under and that Matthew H. the root cause of the children’s suffering was Matthew 
H.’s mental health.857  On appeal, Matthew H. argued that the superior court erred because he 
had taken substantial steps to improve his situation, including cleaning the cabin, obtaining a 
driver’s license and a job, and not testing positive for methamphetamine.858 The supreme court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision. 859 The court noted that a parent’s failure to remedy any 
condition that placed a child in need of aid leaves the child at risk and supports a judicial 
decision to terminate parental rights.860 The court found that the record supported the conclusion 
that Matthew H. had significant mental health issues that negatively affected both his own 
functioning and his ability to parent, and that not only was Matthew H.’s mental health a cause 
of the children’s need of aid, but was a root cause.861 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the 
supreme court held that where a parent’s mental health issues are an underlying cause of a 
child’s need of aid, the failure to remedy mental health can support termination of parental 
rights.862 
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Schaeffer-Mathis v. Mathis 
In Schaeffer-Mathis v. Mathis,863 the supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by denying the wife’s request that the court update its initial child custody 
investigation.864 Schaeffer filed for divorce from Mathis after ten years of marriage, initiating a 
custody dispute over their two children.865 Mathis alleged that Schaeffer had been abusive 
towards him in the past and he was granted a protective order against her.866 After a custody 
investigation, the court ultimately awarded Mathis sole legal and shared physical custody as 
recommended by the court’s investigator.867 The supreme court held that the superior court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying Schaeffer’s subsequent request for an updated investigation 
because the court could get updated information directly from witnesses. The court also stated 
that prolonging the case further was not in the best interest of the children and that there were 
concerns about Schaeffer influencing the children’s answers.868 The supreme court affirmed the 
lower court’s denial of an updated child custody investigation.869  
 
Shanigan v. Shanigan 
In Shanigan v. Shanigan,870 the supreme court held that an income affidavit is mandatory when a 
parent seeks a modification of their child support obligation.871 Pursuant to a 2012 court order, 
Terrence made monthly child support payments to his divorced wife, Elissa.872 In 2014, Terrence 
asked the Child Support Services Division (CSSD) to review his support obligation in hopes of a 
downward modification.873 Based on copies of his previous year’s tax returns and six pay stubs, 
CSSD found that Terrence qualified for a reduction in his support obligation, and the superior 
court granted CSSD’s requested modification over objections from Elissa.874 On appeal, she 
argued that CSSD had incorrectly calculated Terrence’s income and that it erred in granting the 
modification without requiring him to submit an income affidavit.875 The supreme court 
agreed.876 The court found that CSSD had mistakenly calculated Terrence’s adjusted annual 
income, resulting in a material change in circumstances justifying a modification in his support 
obligation. 877 The supreme court also agreed that CSSD, and therefore the superior court, had 
erred by not requiring Terrence to submit an income affidavit.878 The court found that the 
commentary to the Alaska Civil Rules appear to require an income statement provided under 
oath in reviewing a request for a child support obligation modification.879 Thus, the supreme 
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court held that an income affidavit is mandatory in any request for a child support 
modification.880 
 
Thomson v. Thomson 
In Thomson v. Thomson,881 the supreme court held that a divorced husband may not modify the 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) governing his divorce to require that his ex-wife’s 
share of his retirement benefits be based on his salary at the time of divorce instead of his salary 
at the time of retirement, unless that requirement was already established by clear language in the 
QDRO.882 David and Marjorie Thomson married in 1982 and legally divorced in 2006.883 As part 
of their settlement agreement, David and Marjorie agreed that Marjorie would receive 46.96% of 
David’s monthly benefits from his State of Alaska Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(PERS) accounts, which would be enforced by a QDRO.884 For the purpose of negotiating this 
percentage, the value of David’s future benefits were projected based on his average earnings for 
2003-2005.885 The QDRO was signed in 2006 as part of the divorce decree and settlement in 
2006.886 In 2014 David received an updated projection of the total value of his PERS benefits 
based on his average earnings for 2013-2015, which increased the projected value of his benefits 
by 80%, meaning that Marjorie would receive nearly double the amount of benefits in dollars 
than originally anticipated.887 David moved to amend the QDRO to have Marjorie’s portion of 
the benefits calculated using the 2003-2005 projection.888 The superior court, siding with 
Marjorie, found the QDRO lacked the clear language required to divide David’s retirement 
benefits based on his salary prior to divorce, rather than retirement.889 David appealed, arguing 
that references in the QDRO to “marital portion” constituted sufficiently clear language to 
require the use of the 2003-2005 projection.890 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the 
lower court, reasoning that the term “marital portion” simply refers to the numerator of the 
coverture fraction and does not affect the denominator, which is defined by David’s total period 
of employment upon retirement.891 The supreme court explained that, absent clear language, the 
court was required to interpret the QDRO to require the division of benefits based on David’s 
average earnings during the last three years of his career, i.e., 2013-2015.892 In affirming the 
lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that an ex-husband may not modify the QDRO 
governing his divorce to require that his retirement benefits be divided based on his average 
salary upon divorce instead of his average salary upon retirement, unless the QDRO contains 
clear language establishing that requirement.893  
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Timothy W. v. Julia M 
In Timothy W. v. Julia M.,894 the supreme court held that “domestic living partner” in 
25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes was not limited to partners that lived in the same domestic 
household, but also extended to partners who spent a “significant amount of their time in a 
shared domestic environment.”895 Defendant appealed an order that required him to complete a 
parenting class and batterer intervention program before he could continue unsupervised visits 
with his children after the lower court found that his three acts of domestic violence against his 
partner constituted the presumption of AS 25.24.150(j) against unsupervised visitation.896 
Defendant argued that, because defendant and his partner did not reside in the same home,897 the 
trial court was incorrect in finding that he had “a history of perpetrating domestic violence 
against . . . a domestic living partner” in accordance with AS 25.24.150(g), and that the court 
therefore erred in applying AS 25.24.150(j)’s presumption against unsupervised visitation.898 
The supreme court highlighted that “domestic living partner” was undefined in Alaska’s relevant 
statutes, nor had the court defined the term.899 Concerned that limiting the definition to 
traditional households would allow domestic violence cases to “slip through the cracks” and 
thwart the legislative intent of H.B. 385 to protect children from witnessing violence at home, the 
court extended the term “domestic living partner” to include partners that “spend a significant 
amount” of time in a “shared domestic environment.”900 The supreme court remanded for 
findings as to whether the domestic violence occurred during the period that defendant and 
partner were “domestic living partners.”901 Thus, the term “domestic living partner” in AS 
25.24.150(g) is not limited the traditional domestic household, but also includes partners who 
spend a “significant amount of their time in a shared domestic environment.”902 
 
Wagner v. Wagner 
In Wagner v. Wagner,903 the supreme court held that a spouse seeking to avoid responsibility for 
their partner’s premarital debts and liabilities consolidated during the marriage must show that 
the couple intended keep those obligations separate.904 During the course of their marriage, 
Felicia and Richard consolidated student loans Felicia had incurred prior to the marriage with 
additional student loans incurred during the marriage.905 The couple then divorced and Richard 
petitioned to be absolved of responsibility for the premarital portion of the consolidated loan.906 
The superior court, unable to calculate how to separate the premarital portion from the total 
consolidated loan amount, ruled that the consolidated loans were entirely marital debt and held 
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Richard and Felicia equally responsible for the loans.907 On appeal, the supreme court agreed.908 
While noting that spouses are not generally liable for their partner’s premarital debts, the court 
reaffirmed that debt incurred during the marriage is presumptively marital, and therefore 
shared.909 Accordingly, the court found that Richard had the burden of proving that he and 
Felicia intended to keep the amount of the premarital debt separate from the rest of the 
consolidated loans.910 Having failed to do so, the court held that Richard could not succeed in 
claiming that the superior court had erred.911 Affirming the superior court, therefore, the supreme 
court held that when a spouse seeks to avoid responsibility for their partner’s debts incurred prior 
to marriage, he or she has the burden of proving that the couple intended to keep the obligations 
separate.912 
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HEALTH LAW 
 
Brandner v. Providence Health & Services-Washington 
In Brandner v. Providence Health & Services-Washington,913 the supreme court held that a 
doctor may be entitled to a pre-termination hearing as a matter of due process914 and that a 
hospital may not be immune under the Healthcare Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) if it does 
not provide a pre-termination hearing.915 Providence Alaska Medical Center (Providence) 
terminated Brandner’s hospital privileges without providing any type of hearing beforehand, 
with hearings only taking place after the fact.916 Brandner sued Providence for violating his right 
to due process.917 The superior court ruled that Providence did not violate Brander’s due process 
right and that Providence was immune from suit under the HCQIA.918 Brandner appealed both 
rulings.919 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision as to Brandner’s due process 
claim, reasoning that Providence’s interest in providing quality medical care did not outweigh 
the “stigma of medical incompetence” that would attach to Brandner were he summarily 
terminated, given that there was no serious threat to patient care.920 Moreover, the court ruled 
that Providence was not immune from suit under the HCQIA because the hospital failed to meet 
the statute’s immunity requirements in denying Brandner a pre-termination hearing.921 Reversing 
these two lower court holdings, the supreme court held that due process may require a pre-
termination hearing before a hospital may terminate a doctor’s hospital privileges922 and that a 
hospital may not be entitled to immunity under the HCQIA if it does not provide a doctor a pre-
termination hearing.923 
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PROPERTY LAW 
 
Alaska Fur Gallery, Inc. v. Tok Hwang 
In Alaska Fur Gallery, Inv. V. Tok Hwang924, the supreme court held that a sublease provision 
which included an option to purchase the premises with the lease amount to be applied to a 
negotiated purchase price was too indefinite to enforce as an option to purchase.925 Tok Hwang 
subleased a leasehold to Alaska Fur Gallery for $55,000 annual rent for a three-summer term.926 
The lease included an option to purchase the premises with the lease amount to be applied to the 
negotiated purchase price.927 In 2014, one of Alaska Fur’s owners sought to exercise the 
purchase option, but Hwang asserted any agreement to negotiate was nonenforceable.928 Both 
parties moved for summary judgment, with Alaska Fur claiming the refusal to negotiate by 
Hwang violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and an implied agreement to 
negotiate in good faith.929 The superior court held that the contract was unenforceable as written 
because there was no price or method for determining price.930 The supreme court affirmed the 
lower court’s decision, reasoning that the disputed provision failed to meet the standard for an 
agreement to negotiate because it did not even include a purchase price or details on how to 
determine a purchase price.931 The court further reasoned that mere mentioning of a negotiation 
does not create an enforceable agreement to negotiate.932 The supreme court affirmed the lower 
court and held a sublease provision including an option to purchase premises with a lease amount 
to be applied to a purchase price was too indefinite to enforce as an option to purchase.933 
 
Bibi v. Elfrink 
In Bibi v. Elfrink,934 the supreme court held value generated by a foreclosure sale constitutes 
payment under the state usury statute but a junior lienholders loses its security interests in a 
property when it is sold in foreclosure by the senior lienholder.935 A couple bought a home using 
loans from a bank and later received an additional loan from a separate lender.936 When the 
couple defaulted on the second loan, the lender foreclosed and purchased the home at the 
foreclosure sale by credit bidding the amount due under the loan, then he filed a complaint for 
forcible entry and detainer.937 The couple divorced, the wife counterclaimed for usury, quiet title 
and possession, and the bank foreclosed its senior deed of trust, whereupon the lender purchased 
the home a second time.938 The lower court found for the lender and denied all the wife’s 
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counterclaims.939  On appeal, the wife argued that the value generated by the first foreclosure 
should constitute payment under the state’s usury statute, she is entitled to recover double the 
amount of usurious interest paid, and the bank’s foreclosure of its senior interests should not cut 
off the junior interest on which her claim for title is based because the purchaser at the 
foreclosure was the junior interest holder.940 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s denial 
of the wife’s usury counterclaim, reasoning that the usury statute prohibits a person from 
receiving, in any manner, a value greater than that prescribed under its terms, thus the noncash 
nature of the value the lender received constitutes payment.941 The court further gave guidance to 
the lower court, in calculating the recovery to the wife, that the usury statute entitled the wife to 
recover double the amount of usurious interest receiver by the lender.942 However, the supreme 
court affirmed the lower court’s denial of the wife’s counterclaim for title and possession and its 
grant of forceful entry and detainer, reasoning that the state’s foreclosure statutes require that 
junior lienholders lose their security interests in a property when it is sold in foreclosure by the 
senior lienholder, and no exception is made when the purchaser at a foreclosure sale is a junior 
lienholder.943 Reversing the lower court’s ruling in part and affirming in part, the supreme court 
held value generated by a foreclosure sale constitutes payment under the state usury statute but a 
junior lienholders loses its security interests in a property when it is sold in foreclosure by the 
senior lienholder.944 
 
Dixon v. Dixon 
In Dixon v. Dixon,945 the supreme court held that a quitclaim deed must designate and describe the 
grantee so as to distinguish him from the rest of the world to be enforceable by the grantee;946 and 
further that conditionally granting does not constitute a parol gift of land.947 Carolyn Dixon owned 
a house encumbered with a mortgage.948 Her son, Dan Dixon, proposed that she refinance the 
house in his name and offered to renovate it.949 Carolyn signed a quitclaim deed, conveying her 
interest in the house to Austin Dixon, Dan’s son and her grandson.950 The quitclaim deed was not 
notarized, formally witnessed, or recorded.951 Dan made repairs to the house and rented it out, but 
stopped making mortgage payments, causing Carolyn to pick up the payments.952 Carolyn sued to 
recover the house from Dan, and Dan counterclaimed for a judgment to quiet title.953 The superior 
court found that Dan had failed to prove that Carolyn intended to gift him the property and that 
Carolyn intended to transfer ownership of the house only on the condition that Dan pay the 
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mortgage, which he failed to satisfy.954 On appeal, Dan argued that the quitclaim deed proved 
Carolyn’s intent to gift Dan the house, even though it lacked the necessary formalities and, in the 
alternative, that his claim fits an exception to the statute of frauds for parol gifts of land.955 The 
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the lower court did not err when 
it rejected the quitclaim deed as persuasive evidence that Carolyn intended to gift the property to 
Dan because the deed unambiguously identified the grantor (Carolyn) and the grantee (Austin) 
while making no mention of Dan.956 The court reasoned that the grantee must be designated on the 
deed so as to distinguish him from the rest of the world and that using another person’s real name 
does not satisfy this standard, especially when both parties know the other person.957 Regarding 
Dan’s parol gift of land theory, the court reasoned that Dan failed to prove that the land had been 
conveyed as a gift because evidence showed that Carolyn only intended to gift Dan the house if 
certain conditions were met.958  Therefore, there was no immediate divestiture of Carolyn’s rights 
to the house and no consequent immediate vesting of ownership rights in Dan, and thus no parol 
gift. 959  Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held a quitclaim deed must 
designate and describe the grantee so as to distinguish him from the rest of the world to be 
enforceable by the grantee;960 and granting property only conditionally does not constitute a parol 
gift of land.961  
 
Prax v. Zaleweski 
In Prax v. Zaleweski,962 the supreme court held that the 2003 amendments to Alaska’s adverse 
possession laws apply to claims that had not vested before their 2003 enactment.963 Zaleweski 
claimed she acquired title to Pax’s parking lot by adverse possession.964 Zaleweski filed suit in 
2013, and the trial court found that she had possessed the property from 2002 to 2012.965 In 
2003, the legislature amended the adverse possession laws to require claimants to prove that they 
believed they owned the property in good faith.966 The trial court found that the good-faith 
requirement did not apply to Zaleweski’s claim because her possession of the parking lot began 
in 2002, a year before the passing of the amendments.967 On appeal, Pax argued that the trial 
court erred by applying the pre-2003 adverse possession laws.968 Examining the text of the 
statute, the supreme court reasoned that the legislature expressly declared the 2003 amendments 
to apply retroactively to claims that had not vested by 2003.969 The supreme court reversed the 
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judgment of the trial court and remanded for further proceedings because the 2003 amendments 
apply to claims that had not vested by their 2003 enactment.970 
 
Yuk v. Robertson 
In Yuk v. Robertson,971 the supreme court held that a property owner may acquire adverse 
possession of a piece of property despite the presence of a municipal sewer easement972 and 
despite mistakenly believing that they own the property.973 In 2010, the Yuks discovered that a 
portion of land on the Robertsons’ side of the fence in fact belonged to the Yuks.974 In 2015, the 
Yuks sued to quiet title, but the Robertsons asserted adverse possession as an affirmative 
defense.975 The lower court ruled in favor of the Robertsons.976 The Yuks appealed, arguing that 
the Robertsons could not establish exclusivity because the parcel of land was subject to a 
municipal sewer easement.977 Moreover, the Yuks argued that the Robertsons could not establish 
hostility because the Robertsons believed that they owned the disputed land.978 The supreme 
court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the Robertsons claimed adverse 
possession over the Yuk’s interest in the land, exclusive of the municipal sewer easement, and 
that the existence of the easement did not prevent the Robertsons’ use of the land as the average 
owner of similar property would us it.979 Furthermore, the supreme court reasoned that the 
Robertsons established hostility because they acted as if they owned the land, as evidenced by 
the fence, and that their subjective state of mind of irrelevant to determining hostility.980 
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that an owner may acquire property 
through adverse possession despite the presence of a municipal sewer easement981 and despite 
mistakenly believing that he or she owned the disputed land.982 
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TORT LAW 
 
Burnett v. Government Employees Insurance Co. 
In Burnett v. Government Employees Insurance Co.,983 the supreme court held that a liability 
insurer can owe a tort duty to a third-party claimant while handling a claims process involving 
both the insured and such third-party claimant.984 A driver of a truck lost control and crashed into 
Burnett’s premises, damaging the property and causing Burnett bodily injuries.985 Government 
Employees Insurance Company (“GEICO”), the driver’s insurer, hired a contractor to inspect the 
damages and coordinate cleanup, allegedly creating a direct obligation between GEICO and 
Burnett for GEICO to provide the cleanup.986 The damages were not cleaned up for almost two 
years after the accident, prolonging and worsening Burnett’s bodily injuries and making the 
premises uninhabitable.987 Burnett filed suit against the driver, but GEICO made a payment to 
Burnett in exchange for withdrawing the claim against the driver.988 Burnet also filed suit against 
GEICO alleging that GEICO had not cleaned up the damages in a reasonable manner.989 GEICO 
argued that it owed no duty to Burnett to act reasonably in handling the cleanup of the premises 
because as a liability insurer, GEICO could not owe a duty to both the insured (the driver) and a 
third-party claimant (Burnett) during the claims handing process.990 The superior court granted 
GEICO summary judgement.991 On appeal, the supreme court disagreed with the superior court’s 
decision, noting that an insurer’s contractual duties to the insured should not negate other and 
completely different common law tort duties that GEICO may have to Burnett. 992 The court 
reasoned that the general rule that prevents third-parties from bringing a direct action against a 
liability insurer should not apply when it is alleged that the insurer contracted directly with the 
third-party claimant.993 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held that a liability insurer 
can owe a tort duty to a third-party claimant if the insurer creates a new and independent duty to 
the third-party claimant, different from the contractual obligation it owes to the insured.994 
 
Burton v. Fountainhead Development, Inc. 
In Burton v. Fountainhead Development, Inc.,995 the supreme court held that a plaintiff suing for 
special damages in a defamation suit must show that the defamatory statements were the legal 
cause of his financial injury.996 Princess Tours hired Burton to work as its guest service host 
stationed at the Bear Lodge hotel.997 Bear Lodge’s management refused to let Burton work at 
Bear Lodge, telling Princess Tours that years earlier Burton had participated in a physical 
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altercation with a guest and had defaced hotel property.998 After a grace period, Princess Tours 
terminated Burton’s employment because Burton could not get transportation to Princess Tours’ 
other hotel partners.999 Burton sued Fountainhead Development, Inc., the owner of Bear Lodge, 
for defamation, claiming its managers’ false statements resulted in his termination.1000 The 
superior court awarded Burton general damages, finding that the statements were defamatory per 
se.1001 However, the superior court denied Burton’s claim for special damages, finding that 
Burton was fired for his inability to relocate, not due to the defamatory statements.1002 On appeal, 
the supreme court upheld the superior court’s ruling, finding that Burton had failed to prove 
causation.1003 The court explained that, in order for Burton to receive special damages for lost 
wages, he needed to prove that the defamatory statements were the legal cause of his 
termination.1004 The court found that the superior court did not err when it concluded that 
Princess Tours fired Burton because of his transportation issues, not because of the 
accusations.1005 The supreme court affirmed, holding that an award for special damages in a 
defamation case requires a showing that the defamatory statements caused a concrete financial 
injury.1006  
 
Coulson v. Steiner 
In Coulson v. Steiner,1007 the supreme court held that alienation of affections is not a recognized 
cause of action in Alaska.1008 Coulson and Omadlao married in 2009.1009 In 2013, Omadlao 
began a romantic relationship with Steiner, and filed for divorce from Coulson a few months 
thereafter.1010 Coulson sued Steiner on the basis of three claims, the first of which was the tort of 
alienation of affections.1011 The tort of alienation of affections is a common law cause of action 
that dates back to the nineteenth century and permits a spouse to sue a third party for interference 
in the marital relationship with the intent to alienate one spouse from the other.1012 Steiner moved 
for summary judgment, contending that alienation of affections was not a cognizable claim.1013 
The superior court agreed and granted Steiner’s motion for summary judgment on that claim.1014 
The supreme court affirmed, disallowing any claims based of alienation of affections.1015 The 
supreme court noted that alienation of affections remains recognized in only a few states today 
because of changing conceptions of marriage, protection of privacy, and limitation of 
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damages.1016 For those public policy reasons, the supreme court joined the majority of states in 
barring the tort of alienation of affections in Alaska.1017 Such a decision, the court noted, was 
furthermore consistent with the rule that economic losses from divorce are not recoverable.1018 
Thus, the supreme court held that alienation of affections is not a cognizable cause of action in 
Alaska.1019  
 
Jovanov v. State Department of Corrections 
In Jovanov v. State Department of Corrections,1020 the supreme court of Alaska held that: (1) the 
Department of Corrections was entitled to summary judgment on Jovanov’s negligence claims 
because the attack on the inmate was not foreseeable and the officer’s five-second response time 
was reasonable,1021 and (2) the discretionary function immunity precluded claims arising out of 
the Department of Corrections decisions regarding resource allocation.1022 Mr. Jovanov is an 
inmate at the Anchorage Correctional Complex and was in an altercation with another inmate 
Modeste.1023 Modeste punched Jovanov on the left side of the head and pushed his head into the 
wall, requiring Jovanov to obtain medical treatment for his injuries. Jovanov sued the Department 
of Corrections (“DOC”) on a variety of claims, including negligence claims based on: (1) an 
allegation that the assault was foreseeable and the DOC should have prevented it and that 
Corrections Officer Robinson failed to respond promptly to the argument and prevent further 
injuries, and (2) DOC was negligent in understaffing the prison unit and placing the officer’s desk 
out of view of the telephone.1024 The court reasoned that because the DOC had no reason to suspect 
any harm posed to Jovanov and that there was no genuine factual dispute on the issue of whether 
Officer Robinson responded promptly, the superior court was correct in granting the DOC’s 
motion for summary judgment on the negligence claims. 1025  The court further reasoned that 
because prison overcrowding is an issue that requires prison officials to make discretionary 
decisions involving staffing levels, Jovanov’s claim regarding staffing decisions, general prison 
overcrowding problems, and DOC’s officer placement decisions is precluded by the doctrine of 
discretionary function immunity.1026 The Alaska supreme court affirmed the superior court’s grant 
of summary judgment in respect to Jovanov’s claim of negligence because the attack was not 
foreseeable, there was no genuine dispute of fact in regards to Officer Robinson’s response time, 
and the staffing decisions are precluded by the doctrine of discretionary function immunity.1027 
 
Recreational Data Services, Inc. v. Trimble Navigation, Ltd. 
In Recreational Data Services, Inc. v. Trimble Navigation, Ltd.,1028 the Supreme Court of Alaska 
held that in a suit in tort the fact of harm and the amount of damages are proved separately, and 
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that if the former is proved, but not the latter, nominal damages may still be recovered.1029 
Recreational Data Services (RDS) had entered into a business arrangement with Trimble where it 
would produce the software, and Trimble Navigation the hardware, for a ruggedized phone with 
specialized apps geared toward the outdoors.1030 Eventually the plan fell through when RDS 
learned a separate division of Trimble was working to market a competing product.1031 RDS 
alleged that this occurred because Trimble Navigation violated the confidentiality agreement 
between the companies, misrepresented that the other Trimble division’s product was not a 
competitor, and intentionally delayed RDS’s project so that the other division of Trimble could 
succeed.1032 The jury found for RDS on all counts, but the superior court granted Trimble 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the basis that RDS had failed to prove damages to a 
reasonable certainty.1033 RDS appealed arguing that it had proven harm so even if the precise 
amount of damages was not proven it was at least entitled to nominal damages.1034 The supreme 
court explained that the fact of harm and the amount of damages are separate issues.1035 It 
elaborated that the former must be proven for recovery, while the latter only need be proven to a 
reasonable certainty to recover compensatory damages.1036 The supreme court concluded that 
though RDS failed to prove the amount of damages or to make a claim for nominal damages, it 
was entitled to nominal damages because it had proven some harm and its pleadings were 
sufficient to imply a claim for nominal damages.1037 Reversing the superior court, the supreme 
court held that in a suit in tort the fact of damages and the amount of damages are proved 
separately, and that if the former is proved but not the latter nominal damages may still be 
recovered.1038 
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TRUSTS & ESTATES 
 
In re Estate of Seward 
In In re Estate of Seward,1039 the supreme court held that a paternity determination may be made 
during estate proceedings in order to determine whether a party has an interest in the probate 
proceeding.1040 In August 2013, attorney Willard applied for probate of the decadent’s will, in 
which the decadent declared that he did not have any children.1041 In October, Mock petitioned 
the court to conduct genetic testing on the decadent’s ashes to prove that he was the decadent’s 
son, and also asked the court to not distribute the proceeds of the decadent’s estate until paternity 
status was ascertained. 1042 The decadent’s counsel argued that a probate proceeding is not the 
proper place for a paternity contest, and Mock lacked standing to contest the decadent’s will 
since “he is not an interested party in [the] estate case.”1043 The supreme court reversed the 
superior court decision, explaining that “when the superior court acts as the probate court it has 
‘jurisdiction over all subject matter relating to decedents’ estates,’” and that its jurisdiction 
extends to “‘questions ancillary’ to the probate proceedings.” 1044 Alaska Statute 13.12.114(d) 
provides that the subject matter jurisdiction of the probate court extends to a “determination of 
heirs and successors” and that the court may determine the existence of a parent and child 
relationship.1045 Thus, the supreme court held that a paternity determination is proper during 
estate proceedings to determine whether a party has standing in the probate proceeding.1046 
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